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Abstract 
The rule of law forms the bedrock for societal and institutional organisation in the 
Western world. International actors see its establishment in developing countries 
as a means to facilitate wider development work and an end in and of itself. 
However, development of the legitimacy of the rule of law is not well understood, 
especially in post-conflict environments where it is most lacking. Despite the best 
efforts of international interventions, the rule of law is often not in the paramount 
position it requires: it lacks legitimacy amongst the people. To understand why 
this is the case there is a need for a better understanding of how interventions 
develop legitimacy in the rule of law. This research develops that understanding 
and asks the question ‘how does the contemporary peacebuilding agenda develop 
the legitimacy of the rule of law in post-conflict states?’ 
 
To do this the research undertakes a case study investigation of a particular 
intervention: the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Discourse and 
content analyses, carried out on interview transcripts and a wealth of 
documentation, reveal the different forces exerted by the intervention to develop 
legitimacy in the rule of law. These are interpreted through a particular lens: a 
modified version of Luke’s three faces of power that also draws on concepts of 
governmentality. A four-dimensional definition of legitimacy also allows for 
greater analytical depth. 
 
The research shows that the contemporary peacebuilding agenda can do some 
things very well. It is especially effective at the initial response to crisis. It is after 
the establishment of this basic security/performance dimension of the rule of law 
that interventions begin to develop their institutional/process dimension through 
capacity building. Capacity building divides into three levels: the individual, the 
organisation, and the state. It integrates the rule of law across the state edifice 
and establishes it as a foundational element of the system.  However, the most 
important aspect of building legitimacy is the development of shared beliefs, as it 
is these that establish what is ‘true’ amongst a society. Contemporary 
peacebuilding interventions portray the rule of law as intrinsically legitimate and 
the correct, rational way of organising society. This idea permeates through their 
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structures, discourses, and methods. However, the rule of law is not intrinsically 
legitimate. It is a culturally constructed concept that in many countries is in 
opposition with alternative ways of organising society and resolving conflict. 
Developing legitimacy in the rule of law is then a struggle between competing 
organisational systems. Such conflict jeopardises gains made by interventions, as 
the rule of law is fighting an uphill battle against other internalised, and often 
more locally reverent, norms. If it is to establish in post-conflict environments, 
the rule of law and competing systems need to interact to produce a locally 
relevant, hybrid, conception of the rule of law. One that is recognisable to all 
sides, but unique to the context. This leads to peace. 
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Chapter One: Why the Rule of Law? 
“The rule of law underpins achieving the mission of the United Nations: to 
advance peace, human rights, and development. In our rapidly changing 
unequal, and, at times, dangerous world, implementing the rule of law is 
critical for establishing the justice, stability, and inclusive growth required 
for sustained human development.”  
(Helen Clark, 2012, p.1) 
 
The rule of law is at the heart of Western civilisation and is a chief export of the 
development industry. Its role as the principle way to organise society is an 
ancient one: according to Aristotle, people are the most terrible of all animals 
when they live without law and without justice and the best when they do. It is the 
rule of law that mediates the relationship between the state and the individual, it 
controls behaviour to protect the many from the few and, sometimes 
unfortunately or, protect the few from the many. The rule of law permeates all 
aspects of society and is a foundational element of Western institutions, including 
those with a development focus, such as NGOs and government aid programmes. 
Not only does the rule of law form a central part of how they interpret issues and 
see problems, they are also dependant on it to function due to the rules-based 
environment they operate in. It is understandable then why developing the rule of 
law is one of the priority tasks in what are some of the great works of collective 
human ingenuity  (or arrogance) of our age: the active, purposeful development 
or reconstruction of a modern state over a comparatively short time scale in a 
post-conflict environment:  peacebuilding.  
 
The UN Secretary-General defined the rule of law as: 
 
“A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence 
to [its] principles.”  
[Emphasis added] (2004, p.4) 
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The rule of law is more than the laws themselves. It is a way of seeing the world 
that places it as the supreme way of organising society and oneself. It is this 
worldview, this internalisation of the rule of law and its principles, which is the 
most powerful measure to ensure adherence to its tenets. This requires 
legitimacy, something that the rule of law is often thought to intrinsically have 
(Anderson, 2012).  
 
However, intellectual movements like post-structuralism and other ideas 
associated with the linguistic turn, have questioned the supremacy of the rule of 
law. Investigations of alternative epistemologies and the effects of language on 
how we see the world have led to the rejection of ‘metanarratives’, grand theories 
about how the world is structured.  Authors such as Brooks (2003) reveal the rule 
of law as such a metanarrative: it is a culturally constructed idea and something 
that is no more ‘true’ than any other way of ordering society. With this exposed, 
the development of the rule of law becomes a struggle of different beliefs of the 
true and legitimate way to organise society and manage conflict.  The purpose of 
this research is to investigate this struggle for legitimacy. 
 
The research seeks to uncover how the contemporary peacebuilding agenda 
develops legitimacy in the rule of law in post-conflict states. To do this, the 
following sub-questions need answering: 
 
- What are the different strategies used to develop legitimacy in the rule 
of law? 
- What effects does the legitimacy of the intervening institution have? 
- What are the long-term implications of how the contemporary agenda 
operates on sustainability and development? 
 
These questions are answered by using a focused case-study approach on the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began work in 
2003 after civil unrest and the near total collapse of the Solomon Islands state. 
Yet, before we delve any deeper into this, there is a need for a further positioning 
of the research within peacebuilding and development. 
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Peacebuilding and Development 
Traditionally peacebuilding and development have not been closely aligned and 
the exclusivist position sees them as two very different processes (Smoljan, 
2003). However, there are calls for bringing the two closer together, with people 
such as Smoljan (2003), Rossier (2011), and Leest et al. (2010) working on how 
this can be done. The High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons, discussing the post-
2015 development agenda, also recognises the need to bring peacebuilding and 
development together (Attree, 2013). In a report published in May 2013, they 
promote a development paradigm based on five transformative shifts. One of 
these is to “Build peace and effective, open and accountable institutions for all” 
and states that the development community must: 
 
“recognise peace and good governance as core elements of wellbeing, not 
optional extras … Responsible and legitimate institutions should 
encourage the rule of law, property rights, freedom of speech and the 
media, open political choice, access to justice and accountable government 
and public institutions.”  
[Emphasis added] (UN, 2013, p.9) 
 
It is this inclusivist position, as termed by Smoljan (2003), which this research 
takes. It views peacebuilding and development as two sides of the same coin and 
that both cannot achieve lasting success without the other. The European 
Peacebuilding Liaison Office (2011) explains that at their core, both development 
and peacebuilding are about strengthening resilience and the capacity within 
society for it to cope with change and solve problems. For peacebuilding to be 
sustainable, it requires a wider process of development to address the underlying 
drivers of conflict and to ensure it does not remerge. Conversely, development 
cannot be successful without the initial peace that peacebuilding brings. It 
provides the conditions necessary for progress and mainstream development 
institutions to operate in the country, one of which being the rule of law. This 
relationship makes peacebuilding just the first stage of development and 
development just the second stage of peacebuilding. 
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Structure 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three provide the main context for the research. 
Chapter Two looks at the history of Solomon Islands from the pre-colonial period 
until RAMSI first entered the country in 2003. Drawing on the country’s rich 
history develops a picture that explores what factors shape the present day 
Solomon Islands. Chapter Three introduces RAMSI and provides an overview of 
why it intervened, its actions in the country, what it looked like as an 
organisation, and what issues developed. Particular attention is paid to academic 
discussions of how RAMSI operated. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the wider literature of relevance to the research. This 
literature review is divided into three parts.  The first draws on international 
academic literature to portray the dominant contemporary peacebuilding agenda, 
described as the liberal peace consensus. After sketching what this agenda looks 
like, the section moves on to discussing its main criticisms and ends with the 
leading ideas for improvement. Section two takes a close look at the rule of law. It 
reveals it to be a culturally defined phenomenon and by no means intrinsically 
legitimate.  Along with the criticisms this brings, there are important issues with 
the development of the rule of law in post-conflict environments to consider. 
Finally, a thorough investigation of the concept of legitimacy provides a working 
definition for the research and establishes the main theoretical lens used to 
unpick its development: a combination of Lukes’ three dimensions of power and 
governmentality. 
 
Chapter Four presents the research methodology. In any research, especially 
research concerned with discourse, it is important to discuss the epistemology 
and positionality of the researcher. Chapter Four begins with such a discussion, 
first focusing on the post-positivist epistemology and then moving on to the 
implications of my own positionality. A presentation of data collection and 
analysis methods follows. The chapter concludes with key ethical considerations 
and the clearing up of some potential ambiguities.  
 
Having established the required precursors, Chapter Five, Chapter Six, and 
Chapter Seven present the research findings. In conjunction with the 
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information presented in the literature review, they undertake a discussion of 
how peacebuilding in Solomon Islands has influenced the legitimacy of the rule of 
law. To give order to such a complex picture, peacebuilding in Solomon Islands is 
divided into three main periods, each represented by a chapter. While broad dates 
are given, these demarcations are relatively arbitrary, the transition from one to 
the other was always gradual, and the shift never complete. The first section deals 
with the initial restoration of law and order when RAMSI first arrived in Solomon 
Islands. It also looks at the implications of the enabling legislation that made the 
intervention possible. The subsequent chapter investigates the statebuilding 
actions undertaken after law and order was restored, namely the work of in-line 
staff and staff in capacity building roles.  The discussion of the third phase of 
peacebuilding in Chapter Seven focuses on the significant shifts in RAMSI that 
occurred in response to issues raised about the intervention in 2006/2007 and 
some particular prominent discourses. 
 
The broader findings from the discussion are drawn together in Chapter Eight 
to address the research question and conclude the thesis. By describing the 
different strategies used to develop legitimacy in the rule of law, unpicking the 
effects of the intervening interventions legitimacy, and assessing the long-term 
implications of what was done, this chapter takes what has been learned from 
RAMSI and draws conclusions on the liberal peace consensus and wider 
processes of development. 
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Chapter Two: Situating the Case Study 
Research cannot be separated from the context and history of the research site. 
This chapter presents the key contextual and historical factors that are of 
relevance for the thesis. Chronologically this chapter takes its end at the arrival of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. 
 
Solomon Islands is a diverse country with an interesting history, characterised by 
patchy colonial rule and a checkered post-independence past.  It is comprised of 
around 1000 islands, with a total land area over 28,000km2 (Allen, 2012; Clark 
and Levy, 2012). The population is growing by 2.3—2.5 percent per annum and 
85 percent of this population lives rurally (Cox et al., 2012). According to the 
Solomon Islands Government (SIG) 2009 census the population was 95.3 percent 
Melanesian, 3.1 percent Polynesian, 1.2 percent Micronesian, and 0.3 percent 
other (mostly Chinese and Europeans) (2009a). The country is noted for its 
cultural diversity, for example having over 64 living languages (Fraenkel, 2004). 
For the purposes of this short background on Solomon Islands, its history has 
been broken into four main periods: 
 
- Pre-colonial period: Everything  until annexation in 1893 
- Colonial rule: From 1893 until independence in 1978 
- Post-independence government: From independence until 1998 
- Civil unrest, or the ‘Tensions’: From 1998 until 2003 
 
A person’s background, their positionality, shapes how they think and interpret 
issues (Willis, 2007). Consideration of the historic forces that have shaped 
Solomon Islands is therefore important to the research, as it influences peoples’ 
actions and what they perceive as legitimate. Solomon Islands culture, kastom 
(unique governance and dispute management processes (World Bank, 2013)), 
and communities are dynamic and constantly evolving (Brigg, 2009). They 
absorb and respond to forces generated in all periods of the country’s history. 
However, it is from the pre-colonial period that characteristic elements of 
Solomon Islands emerge (Boege et al., 2009). It is to these pre-colonial roots we 
now turn. 
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The Pre-Colonial Period 
Before annexation by colonial powers, the Solomon Islands Archipelago consisted 
of a collection of distinct communities, living in relatively close geographic 
proximity. These people started arriving over 30,000 years ago when the sea level 
was lower and the archipelago consisted of fewer and larger islands. Sea level rise 
around 10,000 years ago caused the geographical separation of these people. The 
populations then begin to diverge culturally, greatly contributing to the 
differences present today, especially regarding language (Moore, 2004).  This has 
resulted in kastom, which while similar, can have very significant differences. 
One example is how inheritance operates. Inheritance is mainly matrilineal on 
Guadalcanal, Isabel, Makira, and the Russell Islands, while on Malaita, Choiseul, 
Rennell and Bellona, Tikopia, and the Shortland Islands it is predominantly 
patrilineal (Fraenkel, 2004).  Trade existed amongst the different communities. 
However, it was people’s relationship with their local community, kastom, and 
history that defined their identity (Brigg, 2009).  Politically, it was the ‘big men’ 
who held power in communities. These are non-hereditary leaders (though these 
do exist) whose success lies in their ability to mobilise resources, attract followers, 
and bring renown (Bennett, 1987; Braithwaite et al., 2010). These factors 
combined meant that Solomon Islands and the concept of a Solomon Islander did 
not exist until colonial powers divided the map of the South Pacific. 
 
The Colonial Period 
Great Britain annexed the southern regions of Solomon Islands in 1893, after 
pressure from Australia over fears that other colonial powers would claim the 
area (Dinnen, 2009). The northern section of present day Solomon Islands was 
originally claimed by Germany, with Britain gaining control of this area in 1899 
(Fraenkel, 2004). The period of colonial rule was characterised by neglect. Britain 
called for the colony to be self-sufficient in funding, resulting in a lack of financial 
support for the colony. As the British High Commissioner in Solomon Islands put 
it in 1974: 
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“Up to 1952 this remote collection of scattered communities was expected 
to pay for its own administration. The staff of this administration was 
minute.” 
(Luddington, 1974, p.2) 
 
These limitations led to a state that was far weaker and had less penetration than 
local systems and kastom. The colonial administration did attempt reforms to 
bring the state and Solomon Islanders together. For example, the 1945 plan 
aimed to delegate substantial authority to local councils, including control over 
revenue. Unfortunately, the lack of financial support and the skeleton crew of 
administrators also hamstrung these initiatives (Campbell, 2007).  
 
World War Two had a significant impact on Solomon Islands and shook attitudes 
towards colonial rule. In his 1974 report, Luddington stated that: 
 
“… the shock of the sight of modern warfare and the abundant technology 
of the allied forces in this area must have been enormous and has affected 
Solomon Island attitudes ever since. There appears to be in the minds of a 
great many Solomon Islanders the hope, however much suppressed, that 
some of riches seen between 1942-45 will again sail into Solomons, 
descend from the skies or come out of the ground.” 
(1974, p.2) 
 
World War Two brought modernity to Solomon Islands, creating a view into the 
West and greater demand for what modernity could bring. The Maasina Ruru 
movement emerged, in part from the experiences of Solomon Islanders in World 
War Two. It sought to restructure indigenous society, obtain independence, 
improve living standards, and create a new social order based on kastom (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 2012). A significant aspect of the colonial 
period was the increased inter-island migration it fostered. For example, after the 
destruction of the old capital Tulagi in Central Province, Malaitan immigrants 
were brought to Guadalcanal to assist in the building of the new capital, Honiara 
(Campbell, 2007). Prior to World War Two Malaitans also engaged in a largely 
coercive (via indenture contracts) plantation labour system, resulting in 
additional migration (TRC, 2012).  
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Overall, the lack of financial support and the limited capacity of the colonial 
administration in Solomon Islands resulted in a relatively light colonial 
experience. This minimised the negative elements of colonial rule experienced by 
other indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, it also meant there was little initiative to 
develop a unified front to oppose colonialism. Prior to independence, there was 
little drive for independence amongst Solomon Islanders and little ideological 
cohesion across the country (Bennett, 1987). Bennett argued that because of this, 
when a Britain nervous of the changing world economy thrust independence on 
the country, Solomon Islands was ill prepared to meet the requirements placed on 
it. 
 
Post-Independence Government 
Certain significant trends that characterise the post-independence Solomon 
Islands also highlight the main causes of the Tensions from 1998 to 2003. It is 
important to note that these trends still largely apply to the present day Solomon 
Islands, as many of the underlying causes of the Tensions have yet to be fully 
addressed (Dinnen and Haley, 2012). These trends can be broken into the 
following issues: 
 
- Inter-island migration 
- The distribution of resources 
- The delivery of justice 
 
Tying these three matters together is an important cross cutting theme: the 
failure of SIG to respond adequately to these problems (Wielders, 2003). It is this 
cross cutting matter that we must first consider. 
 
The National Parliament of Solomon Islands is a Unicameral Legislature, 
modelled after the British Westminster Parliament. Elections are held every four 
years, there are 50 constituencies, and the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system is 
used (SIG, 2007). Politics in Solomon Islands is characterised by the influence of 
‘big men’, and a lack of nationalism (Dinnen, 2009). Party politics has 
traditionally been very weak, as politicians are strongly tied to their locality, and 
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the most pressing concern regarding re-election is appeasing these local 
constituencies (Ride, 2010).  In Solomon Islands, this means securing 
development projects and resources for the locality as: 
 
 “Living mostly in rural villages, bonds of kinship, shared languages and 
ties to ancestral land, along with moral frameworks drawing on kastom, 
and Christianity, provide the basis of individual identities and allegiance 
rather than abstract notions of “citizenship” or “nationalism”.” 
(Dinnen, 2009, p.72) 
 
Dinnen (2009) is describing the wantok system, where people and politicians are 
tied to their wantok. Literally translated as ‘one talk’, this means one’s local 
community as defined by shared language and kastom (Moore, 2004). Brigg 
(2009) defines two levels in the wantok system. The first, and most intimate, ties 
together people in their immediate community or village. The second relates to 
the broader linguistic group. The ‘big men’ system of political organisation 
described earlier, also strongly permeates the Solomon Islands political system 
(Braithwaite et al., 2010). This translates to these big men vying for election into 
central government (Boege et al., 2009). It is often very difficult for elected 
representatives to meet the expectations placed on them and this results in a high 
rate of MP turnover. Generally, in Melanesia it is common for around 50% of MPs 
to lose their seats at election time (Liloqula and Pollard, 2000). This highly fluid 
political nature makes long-term decision-making difficult. Politicians must focus 
on their immediate electoral survival, rather than shaping the long-term future of 
the state and meeting the needs of some abstract unit known as the ‘nation’. 
 
Despite the focus amongst politicians on providing for their locality, there has 
been little penetration of state services in Solomon Islands outside of the capital 
and selected provincial centres (Braithwaite et al., 2010; Kabutaulaka, 2005).  
Generally, the state has a minimal presence in the lives of rural Solomon 
Islanders, who form the majority of the population (Dinnen, 2009; Barcham, 
2009).  This, joined with the difficulties in decision-making arising out of the 
Solomon Islands political environment, meant the government was unable to 
properly respond to the issues developing in the post-independence era. 
Richmond (2011) describes how the Tensions emerged because of this 
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fundamental government failure, which proceeded to undermine any semblance 
of a social contract. To understand properly both this era of Solomon Islands and 
the present day, we must also look at the other significant issues. 
 
Issues concerning inter-island migration are probably the most frequently cited 
in discussions of the Tensions.  As mentioned above, migration was prevalent 
during colonial rule where economic opportunities were concentrated in 
provincial centres, especially in Honiara and its surrounding plains. This 
migration continued in the post-colonial era (Allen, 2012). Guadalcanal and 
Malaita are two of the largest islands in the country, as shown in Figure 1. 
According to the 2009 census, Guadalcanal has a population of 158,222 (65,609 
of which live in Honiara) and Malaita has a population of 137,596. Population 
pressure and a limited supply of fertile agricultural land on Malaita have 
contributed to Malaitan migration (Fraenkel, 2004). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Solomon Islands (Vidiani, 2013)  
 
The main area where problems arose from this migration was on Guadalcanal, 
where people indigenous to the island felt that Malaitan immigrants were 
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dominating employment, especially in Honiara (Moore, 2004). Related concerns 
were that Malaitans were not paying proper respect to Guadalcanal kastom, and 
illegally taking land (Liloqula and Pollard, 2000). These concerns were formally 
submitted to SIG in the Bona Fide Demands of the Indigenous People of 
Guadalcanal, first in 1988 and again 1999 (2012). While this discontent was 
mainly on Guadalcanal, similar attitudes toward Malaitans were also present in 
the Western Province (Fraenkel, 2004).  
 
Solomon Islands was, and still is, characterised by very unequal distributions of 
wealth (Dinnen and Haley, 2012). Claims of the inadequate distribution of 
resources are especially pertinent to the collection (or lack of it) and uneven 
distribution of revenue from extractive industries. The Solomon Islands economy 
relies on primary industries, namely fishing, mining, palm oil, copra, cocoa, and, 
especially, logging (Morgan and McLeod, 2006). Most frequently targeted are 
those dealing with the logging industry, where there are allegations regarding the 
mismanagement of revenue. Firstly, there are serious problems inhibiting the 
collection of revenue, including under-reporting of log exports, deliberate 
misinterpretation of tree species,  export duty evasion, and the general prevalence 
of duty remissions, especially before 1996 (Liloqula and Pollard, 2000). Added to 
this are issues of corruption, where logging companies bribe politicians to obtain 
tax remissions. Logging companies also approach individuals, to purchase 
communally owned land from which the individual profits, but not the 
community (Hameiri, 2012). These issues described by Hameiri (2012), along 
with the influence of the wider process of globalisation, have been linked to the 
breakdown of social order in some areas as leaders are seen to be abusing their 
authority for private gain (Allen et al., 2013).   
 
These corruption issues are wider than just those dealing with the logging 
industry. The country’s branch of Transparency International has called 
corruption in Solomon Islands ‘systemic’ (Radio New Zealand, 2013). In the 2013 
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 52% of respondents 
felt that political parties were corrupt or extremely corrupt, 53% felt this about 
the civil service and, 85% about the police.  The factors facilitating corruption 
worsened over time. Clark and Levy (2012) describe the deterioration of the 
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Auditor General’s Office from the mid-1990s due to a lack of resources and 
general neglect.  More generally, a lack of government capacity is seen to be a 
driving force behind corruption (Barcham, 2009).  
 
Allen et al. (2013) discuss how this breakdown in social-order has led to growing 
issues of law and order. Generally, in Solomon Islands, “Justice, policing, access 
to land, and social support is still mainly provided through customary, 
community, and village means” (Richmond, 2011, p.128). The breakdown in 
social order and mechanisms of dispute resolution has led to increased problems, 
especially regarding substance abuse, land disputes, development project issues, 
marital disputation and domestic violence (Allen et al., 2013). The weak local 
court system in Solomon Islands does not help these problems. Issues regarding 
staff shortages appeared as early as 1985 and a process of centralisation 
undertaken in the 1990s further weakened local courts in the provinces (Evans et 
al., 2011). By the 1990s, local courts were falling into disuse, and they ceased 
operating almost entirely with the breakdown of government services in the 
Tensions (Goddard, 2010). Compounding these issues in the post-Tensions 
period is the continued distrust of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
(RSIPF), due to the corrupt and illegal behaviour of some officers during the 
unrest (Dinnen and Haley, 2012). Understanding why this is the case requires a 
further look at the Tensions.  
 
The Tensions 
Civil unrest in Solomon Islands began to emerge in late 1998 after a speech by the 
Guadalcanal Premier Ezekiel Alebua in which demands were made of the 
government including: 
 
- S$2.5 million in compensation for 25 alleged murders on Guadalcanal 
- Compensation for the use of Honiara as the capital 
- A halt to inter-island migration 
(Fraenkel, 2004) 
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The Bona Fide Demands of the Indigenous People of Guadalcanal (1999) put 
these demands, and more, forward. After this speech the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army, later renamed the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) began 
harassing and intimidating settlers from other islands. These settlers were mainly 
those from Malaita living in the rural and peri-urban areas to the east and west of 
Honiara (Allen, 2012). Over the months, this campaign began to involve murder, 
rape, and the eviction of around 20,000 settlers by July 1999 (Kabutaulaka, 
2005). The majority of these evictions occurred between May and July 1999, with 
over 70% of those evicted coming from rural wards in the northern areas of 
Guadalcanal (Allen, 2012). On 14 June 1999, a four-month state of emergency 
was declared and special powers were given to police to use violent force (Moore, 
2004). Efforts by SIG to undertake peace negotiations were largely unsuccessful, 
not helped by the lack of attendance from any IFM members (Wielders, 2003). 
 
Malaitans saw the government’s response to the IFM as inadequate and by 2000 
the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) had emerged as a reaction (Fraenkel, 2004). This 
force had backing from members of the RSIPF who undertook a raid on the 
national armoury (Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007), resulting in the MEF being 
generally better equipped than the IFM. Violence between the two groups 
intensified with unconfirmed numbers being killed (Kabutaulaka, 2004).  On 5 
June 2000, the MEF forced the resignation of the Prime Minster Ulufa’alu (Allen, 
2012; Kabutaulaka, 2005). Following this ‘coup’, violence continued until the 
signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement on 15 October 2000.  
 
This agreement ended the open conflict, but it marked a transition towards a state 
of general lawlessness (Wielders, 2008).  Members from both militia groups, 
members of other factions that developed, and unaffiliated individuals continued 
to commit crimes, which would result in the death of over 200 people by the time 
RAMSI intervened (TRC, 2012). Two significant crimes were the murder of ten 
Kwaio (Malaitan) men by Harold Keke and his followers on the Weather Coast, 
and the decapitation of a Guadalcanal man at the main Honiara market in 
November 2001 (PIFS, 2004). This period was characterised by extensive 
extortion of the government through the guise of compensation payments, which 
placed the government on the verge of bankruptcy (Kabutaulaka, 2005). The near 
 
 
15 
 
bankruptcy of the government and the general economic paralysis caused by the 
conflict put SIG on the verge of collapse (Wainwright, 2003).  
 
Conclusion 
Solomon Islands is a very diverse country with a complex history. Presented here 
are just the most pertinent elements of pre-intervention Solomon Islands. It is 
important to reiterate that the time-periods chosen are arbitrary and the factors 
described in each flow through the others until the present day. Especially 
important trends that continue are the prevalence of kastom and wantokism, the 
weakness of the state and the concept of the nation, and the importance of big 
men in politics. The more modern historical factors affecting the country were 
organised by looking at the main issues that led to the Tensions. More than any 
other period these apply to the modern day, as many of these underlying factors 
have yet to be addressed. Concerns over inter-island migration, the distribution of 
resources, and the delivery of justice continue to be an issue. Of course, the most 
well-known element of Solomon Islands history is the civil unrest, known as the 
Tensions, which occurred between 1998 and 2003. This conflict put SIG on the 
verge of collapse and becoming a ‘failed state’. It was the fear of this happening 
that led to the eventual deployment of RAMSI at the request of SIG. 
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Chapter Three: The Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands 
“The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands came with a 
purpose, determined to assist a neighbour in need. Its arrival, shortly after 
the first rays of dawn struck the tarmac of Solomon Islands Henderson 
International Airport on Thursday 24 July 2003, was an event that has 
changed the course of a nation’s history.”  
(RAMSI, 2013a, p. 5) 
 
While the above quote does read like propaganda, it is undeniable that the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was a significant event. 
It was an Australian and police led intervention, with a significant military 
contingent. It brought in over 2000 personnel from all across the Pacific, mainly 
from Australia (RAMSI, 2013a; Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007). It has received 
considerable attention internationally, both positive and negative. This chapter 
highlights the key aspects of the intervention and delves into the academic 
discussions on RAMSI. 
 
The Decision and First Action 
On 4 July 2003, the Governor-General of Solomon Islands, Sir Reverend John Ini 
Lapli, formally requested assistance from the Australian government. Three 
documents were then decided on that formed the legal framework of RAMSI; 
these were the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003, the Facilitation 
of International Assistance Notice 2003, and the RAMSI Treaty. RAMSI was 
officially mobilised on the 24 July 2003 with personnel from across the Pacific 
(SIG, 2009b). Under these documents, the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) 
retained judicial, legislative, and executive authority (Fullilove, 2006). The 
decision to intervene was a significant change in the Australian position on the 
conflict, as the Australian Government had refused assistance when SIG 
requested it earlier. After the fact in 2004, the then Special Coordinator (the 
highest civilian perception within RAMSI) Nick Warner explained that 2003 was 
the right time because the conflict had reached a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, 
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while an intervention in 2000 would not have had a broad base of public support 
in country (Warner, 2004a).  
 
The focus on global terrorism after September 11 and the perceived risk that failed 
states could become havens for terrorist organisations was one of the main 
drivers for the intervention (Hameiri, 2007; Kabutaulaka, 2005; Wielders, 2008). 
Regarding this, then Australian Prime Minister John Howard (2003) justified 
intervention stating that: 
 
“A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the 
Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole 
region ... Poor governance and endemic corruption provide the conditions 
that support criminal activities.” 
(n.p.) 
 
From this, it is clear to see that the justification for intervention was geopolitical 
rather than humanitarian. The immediate restoration of law and order was the 
primary concern of RAMSI upon deployment. This has remained its main focus 
(Jeffery, 2013). According to the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) (2004) 
within 100 days of intervention, RAMSI had made significant progress in 
restoring law and order: recovering over 3700 firearms and making 340 arrests 
by the end of 2003. 
 
Moving Towards Statebuilding and Rising Discontent 
Upon the immediate restoration of law and order, RAMSI began its second phase, 
a process of state and nation building with a focus on capacity building (Hameriri, 
2007). A consolidation period that lasted from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 
2004 linked these two phases. This period was characterised by a focus on 
strengthening the rule of law, legislative reform and creating the conditions for a 
market economy (Morgan and McLeod, 2006). The 2009 Partnership 
Framework sets out the following goal for RAMSI: 
 
“A peaceful Solomon Islands where key national institutions and functions 
of law and justice, public administration and economic management are 
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effective, affordable and have the capacity to be sustained without 
RAMSI’s further assistance.”  
(SIG, 2009c, p.6) 
 
This involved working on three main pillars: law and justice, economic 
governance and growth, and the machinery of government (SIG, 2009c). The law 
and justice pillar involved the transformation of the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force (RSIPF) into a “modern, effective and independent police force which has 
the full confidence and support of the community” (RAMSI, n.d.a). RAMSI also 
worked closely with Solomon Islands judicial and correctional systems to build 
capacity and “ensure all Solomon Islanders have access to strong, fair and 
efficient justice” (RAMSI, n.d.b). A further transition occurred on 1st July 2013, 
where only the policing component of RAMSI remained, while the rest of its work 
moved over to bilateral aid programmes (Coppel, 2012). 
 
RAMSI continued to maintain significant support amongst Solomon Islanders. 
Some 86% of respondents in the RAMSI (2013) People’s Survey said they 
supported the presence of RAMSI. However, Allen (2009) says this is misleading, 
as the majority of respondents to the survey are rural and may not fully 
understand the role of RAMSI. This statement is strengthened by evidence in the 
2011 People’s Survey itself that amongst certain rural participants in focus groups 
“there was a general a [sic] lack of awareness of the role and responsibilities of 
RAMSI” (RAMSI, 2011, p.97). Growing dissatisfaction with RAMSI also became 
apparent in the 2006 riots in Honiara, in which around 50 RAMSI staff were 
injured and RAMSI property was damaged (O’Connor, 2007). Morgan and 
McLeod (2006) describe how grievances about political decision-making, often 
done behind closed doors and with large sums of money changing hands, partially 
triggered the riots. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the agreement with 
intervention being dependant on permission from SIG, RAMSI was tied to the 
government both legislatively and in the eyes of the public (Morgan and McLeod, 
2006).  
 
The 2006 riots, and the subsequent attacks on RAMSI by then Prime Minister 
Manasseh Sogavare, were a moment where many different concerns with RAMSI 
came to a head. An issue that has been especially important was the allegations 
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that RAMSI had behaved as a shadow government and usurped sovereignty from 
SIG (Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007). Another significant issue was allegations that 
RAMSI was not meaningfully participating and engaging with Solomon Islanders 
in their activities. For example, RAMSI staff had their food imported specifically. 
They also frequently congregated together in selected areas, a phenomenon that 
one local termed ‘Lime Lounge Syndrome’ (Braithwaite et al., 2010): the Lime 
Lounge being a local café frequented by development professionals. After the 
2006 riots, RAMSI made real efforts to respond to these issues. Work was done to 
establish jointly agreed targets for the three pillars, along with other initiatives 
such as a joint consultative forum (O’Callaghan, 2008; Richmond 2011). RAMSI 
also developed its community outreach programme to access the voices of 
Solomon Islanders (Coppel, 2012). Despite these efforts made by RAMSI, it is still 
important to consider all the issues to understand the effects of them on 
legitimacy in the rule of law.  
 
Discussions Regarding RAMSI 
Braithwaite el al. (2010) provides a comprehensive discussion of how RAMSI 
acted as a shadow government. They argue that, with its extensive inline 
positions, and the fact that RAMSI had assumed the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force, RAMSI became a parallel system to SIG. Over time, this issue led to 
increased resentment of RAMSI by members of the political and bureaucratic 
elite, despite RAMSI’s popular support (Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007). Morgan 
and McLeod (2006) retell how members of parliament felt marginalised from the 
decision-making process: an example given by members being how appropriation 
bills passed by the government were then modified by RAMSI staff in the 
Department of Finance. The power held by these inline positions, and also the 
advisors, led Kabutaulaka (2008) to suggest that the intervention looked more 
like a neo-trusteeship or shared sovereignty model, rather than the stated and 
legislated subservience of RAMSI to SIG.  
 
The 2009 SIG committee report into the RAMSI intervention looked at these 
issues around RAMSI acting as a parallel government and found that: 
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“There have in the past been justifiable concerns that the work of RAMSI 
has not been well coordinated with the policy objectives and priorities of 
the Solomon Islands Government. That is not to say that RAMSI 
deliberately set out to operate as a parallel government in Solomon 
Islands as some have alleged. Nevertheless, there have justifiably been 
sovereignty issues raised.” 
(SIG, 2009b, p. XV)  
 
The report went on to explain that the committee took it that these concerns had 
largely been addressed by new mechanisms for co-ordination and the 
Partnership Framework document agreed on between RAMSI and SIG in 2009.  
 
In their 2010 book Braithwaite et al. also discuss two fundamental, but 
understandable, flaws in RAMSI’s approach to capacity building in the RSIPF. 
When the Participating Police Force (PPF) would first arrive in an area and 
restore law and order, Solomon Islanders would praise them, rather than the 
RSIPF members on patrol with the PPF. The PPF would accept this credit to the 
detriment of the RSIPF. By not putting the RSIPF at the forefront, they were not 
given an opportunity to rebuild the public perception of them.  The other flaw in 
capacity building arose out of PPF members not being as experienced in training 
others as advisors. When their counterpart would make a mistake, be told by the 
advisor how not to make the mistake, and then make the mistake again, 
eventually the PPF officers would simply take over and do it themselves. Peake 
and Brown (2005) also discusses this issue. They explain that police officers 
might not be the best people to train other police, as they do not design their 
training to the particulars of the local environment, leading to things being lost in 
linguistic and cultural translation.   
  
A different criticism is that RAMSI’s focus is too state-centric. Dinnen (2009) 
raises the point that within that state focus there are limits to the capacity 
building approach. He explains that the Solomon Islands state suffers from not 
just capacity related issues, but also issues arising out of the local and global 
forces that have shaped its form.  Too often has the work of statebuilders not 
taken into account the particular history and culture operating within the state 
(see Chapter Four). With respect to the RSIPF, Peake and Brown (2005) highlight 
how in capacity building efforts the differences in operational cultures has been 
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underestimated, leading to things being missed out or misunderstood. The 
importance of differences in cultural backgrounds across all aspects of RAMSI’s 
work is also emphasised by Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007). Unfortunately, writing 
in 2006, Morgan and McLeod described a belief permeating all pillars of RAMSI 
that “culture gets in the way” (p.423).  
 
These concerns about the reluctance to engage with local culture are linked to 
wider concerns (expressed in literature about peacebuilding and described in 
more depth in the proceeding chapter) that the state being developed by RAMSI 
is too focused on the Western definition of a ‘modern’ state. The argument is that 
RAMSI concentrated too strongly on Western concepts of what a state is or 
should be (Morgan and McLeod, 2006). This focus ignored considerations that 
perhaps this type of state is inappropriate for Solomon Islands and marginalises 
important local non-state institutions that are a source of resilience (Hameiri, 
2012; Fry and Kabutaulaka, 2008). For the first point Nanau (2008) highlights 
the view that the Westphalian state that RAMSI is rebuilding has already failed 
the Solomon Islands once, in the Tensions, and focusing just on it is setting the 
government up to fail again.  
 
With respect to the marginalisation of local institutions and systems, the 
quintessential example discussed in literature is the wantok system and its 
negative framing by peacebuilders. Fukuyama (2008) states that state and nation 
builders in Solomon Islands: 
 
“have to confront the wantok system, which to many seems like a unique 
and exotic cultural practice, and a huge obstacle to the country’s 
modernisation. It is indeed an obstacle, but is hardly unique or exotic in 
human history.” 
(p.18) 
 
As explained earlier, the wantok system ties politicians strongly to their local 
constituency, resulting in them often being elected on their ability to provide for 
that constituency. This undermines a sense of the national good. An example 
given is that it can cause local loyalties to outweigh corruption charges brought 
under an unfamiliar Western system (Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007). Yet Brigg 
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(2009) explains how such a description of the wantok system undermines the 
many benefits it can bring. Specifically regarding law and order, it builds 
resilience, provides an important source of social capital, and provides avenues 
for reconciliation-based conflict resolution (Richmond, 2011). 
 
A concern raised in the literature, linked to criticisms of RAMSI’s reluctance to 
engage with the non-state sector and its state-centrism, is that if these issues are 
not addressed, peacebuilding efforts in Solomon Islands will only ever be a band-
aid solution (Morgan and McLeod, 2006). In Solomon Islands, the state often has 
a secondary role in conflict resolution, with customary methods being dominant 
and seen as quicker and more reliable (Kabutaulaka, 2005; Richmond, 2011). 
Peake and Brown (2005) point out that the focus on formal policing in Solomon 
Islands: 
 
“rubs against ingrained allegiances to mechanisms for conflict resolution 
and restorative justice, which often offer solutions that appear more 
expeditious and have greater legitimacy.”  
(p.727) 
 
The strong Western rule of law approach pursued by RAMSI is at its worst 
crowding out indigenous methods of restorative justice, or at the least ignoring a 
potentially useful avenue for maintaining law and order (Peake and Brown, 2005; 
Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007).  Regarding the period of civil unrest, RAMSI’s 
prosecution of perpetrators of serious crimes has been criticised, as it “only 
served to hamper attempts at reconciliation” (Jeffery, 2013, p.14). Solomon 
Islands is largely a relationship-based society. Because of this, if there is to be 
lasting peace, relationships need to be repaired in an effort to address the 
underlying issues that caused the Tensions (Kabutaulaka, 2005).   
 
In response to calls to engage with the non-state sector, and especially calls to 
focus on restorative rather than retributive justice, RAMSI officials frequently 
refer to this being outside RAMSI’s mandate (Dinnen, 2008; Hameiri, 2012). The 
discussion in Chapter Six addresses the mandate in more detail. It is important to 
note, as Aqorau (2008) does, that it is not for RAMSI to address all the 
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underlying causes that led to the Tensions and Solomon Islanders are the ones 
best suited for the task of nation building. 
 
Moving forward from this criticism, some authors have discussed an alternative 
option for state and nation building: a path where a middle ground between 
Western and indigenous systems and institutions is sought and a hybrid state 
developed. Brigg (2009) describes the potential of the wantok system to be 
mobilised to develop an emergent national identity. Diversity and the myriad of 
inter-community connections built via the wantok system form the basis of this. 
One could see how these networked connections would be useful for restorative 
justice, as it would generate greater social pressure. Richmond (2011) describes 
the need for a horizontal, rather than a vertical political system. In such a system, 
the state connects with kastom, chiefs, and churches and works with them, rather 
than in competition. These reflect the wider calls for hybridity discussed in the 
next chapter. Generally, they call for a colonisation of the state edifice with 
indigenous ideas and institutions.  Systems developed in such a way would have 
considerably more buy-in and legitimacy amongst locals (Aqorau, 2008).  
 
Conclusion 
In July 2013, RAMSI marked its ten-year anniversary. All aspects of it bar the 
PPF have shifted over to bilateral aid programmes, and it has moved into what is 
expected to be its final stage. It is too late for RAMSI to change now, but the 
processes and stages it went through still provide useful insight into development 
and peacebuilding as a whole. The academic discussion around RAMSI is still 
applicable to other peacebuilding operations and wider development work, which 
are usually an intervention of some sort. Most importantly for this thesis, RAMSI 
still provides an important case study to investigate broader development/peace-
building trends and contribute to the international discussion on peacebuilding, 
the rule of law, and legitimacy.  
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Chapter Four: Peacebuilding, the Rule of 
Law, and Legitimacy 
Having established both the history of Solomon Islands and the main discussions 
regarding RAMSI, this chapter turns to the wider academic literature relevant to 
the research. This is divided into three main parts, each addressing a core 
element. The first section looks at the wider debates around international 
peacebuilding and delves into the dominant agenda of the time: the liberal peace 
consensus. This agenda, with its institutional focus, is at the core of RAMSI, and 
an investigation of the international consensus, how it treats sovereignty, issues 
raised about it, and methods for improvement are therefore of important 
consideration. Section two looks closely at two interdependent actions 
undertaken in peacebuilding: the development of the rule of law and security 
sector reform. Similar to the first section, the methods for their development, 
issues, and ways forward are investigated. These topics all influence the 
legitimacy of the rule of law. Finally, the third section provides a detailed look 
into the concept of legitimacy. It develops the definition used in the research and 
presents the main theoretical lens used to unpick the different strategies used to 
develop legitimacy. 
 
The Contemporary Peacebuilding Agenda 
This modern peacebuilding agenda, as characterised by external interventions 
based on the liberal peace consensus and the pursuit of institutional 
statebuilding, has received considerable academic attention. This section delves 
into this literature. International interventions are utilised when a state is seen as 
being a failed or failing state. What exactly a failed state looks like is variable, but 
the common agreement is that “a state fails when it is unable to provide basic 
social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to the population at 
large” (Langford, 1999, p.64). The dominant approach for modern peacebuilding 
is termed the liberal peace consensus by Richmond et al. (2011) and the nuances 
of it are discussed below. Central to this consensus is the redefinition of 
sovereignty. While this has allowed interventions to function without 
contradicting international principles, it has also led to some important concerns 
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requiring discussion. Another concern of pertinence is the utilisation of Western 
conceptions of the state that disregard the local context. However, before 
discussing these issues, a look at the international consensus on peacebuilding as 
presented in internationally agreed upon documents is needed.  
 
The Form of Peacebuilding 
The international consensus on peacebuilding places great stock in the 
establishment of international goals and frameworks, much like the wider 
relationship between development, the MDGs, and documents such as the Paris 
Declaration. The current framework for peacebuilding initiatives can be seen in 
the work of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (ID). 
This forum aims to shape international assistance by creating an action plan, 
framework, and objectives for international and national intervention (ID, 2013). 
The participants in ID have agreed to use the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
Goals (PSGs), set out in ‘The New Deal’. These are: 
 
“Legitimate Politics – Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict       
resolution 
Security – Establish and strengthen people’s security 
Justice – Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice 
Economic Foundations – Generate employment and improve livelihoods 
Revenues & Services – Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable 
and fair service delivery” 
(ID, 2011, p.2) 
 
The New Deal is based on the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations 
(2007), the ACCRA Agenda for Action (2008), the 2010 Dili Declaration, and the 
2011 Monrovia Roadmap (New Deal, 2013). Central to these documents is the 
process of capacity building that translates to a state-centric, institutionally-
focused approach.  
 
The type of peacebuilding promoted above is more comprehensive, larger in 
scope, more intrusive, and focuses more on liberal democracy and neoliberal 
economic reforms, than earlier approaches (Roberts, 2008). Richmond et al. 
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(2011) describe this as the liberal peace consensus, which consists of four 
elements: 
 
- The victor’s peace: Top-down, coercive, imposed peace. Based on 
military interventions focused on security and building the 
Westphalian/Weberian state. 
- The institutional peace: Militarised, top-down, coercive peace. Based 
on international administrations focused on state institutions and 
building liberal market orientated states. 
- The constitutional peace: Democratic, partially top-down, partially 
bottom-up, cooperative peace. Based on consent and consensual 
negotiations with the local elite, focused on the democratic framework 
and building peace and liberal states. 
- The civil peace: Just, durable, bottom-up, needs based and rights-based 
peace. Based on local integration and bottom-up peacebuilding . 
 
With its focus on security, institutional, and constitutional reform the first three 
types of peace dominate the modern peacebuilding agenda (Richmond, 2009). 
Implicit in the first two elements is the argument described (but not endorsed) by 
Andrieu (2010), that interventions building a liberal state must first act illiberally 
to establish the state’s monopoly on violence and ensure proper democratic 
process.  
 
The liberal peace consensus forms a continuum with the victor’s peace on one 
side and the civil peace on the other, with a given intervention falling somewhere 
between these two points (Richmond, 2006). Banks (1987) describes two main 
models in the development of the liberal peace consensus. The first he terms the 
conservative model. It focuses on developing peace through institutional 
development and building liberal market economies (Richmond, 2009). It 
represents a strong focus on the victor’s and institutional peace elements. The 
second Banks (1987) describes as orthodox. It is based on international 
interventions working in partnership with the host government and engaging in a 
realist political discourse to obtain legitimacy and undertake its work 
(Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond et al., 2011). It represents the adoption of the 
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principles of good governance into peacebuilding and places greater stress on the 
constitutional peace. It is still focused on building a liberal-democratic state 
through its institutional work (Rubin, 2006), and therefore contains a significant 
element of the institutional peace. The PSGs described earlier embody this model. 
As we shall see this approach does not engage much with the civil peace, and has 
been criticised for this.  
 
The Redefinition of Sovereignty 
A central aspect of the liberal peace consensus is how it treats sovereignty, seeing 
it not as an absolute but as a continuum. Peacebuilding was largely placed on 
hiatus during the Cold War and one of the main reasons for this was the view that 
sovereignty was absolute (Wheeler, 2002). For example, the trusteeship system 
established in the 1945 UN Charter, which aimed to assist countries in 
decolonisation and help countries towards self-governance, embodied this idea 
(Langford, 1999).  Protecting the sovereignty of the recipient country was 
paramount (Chandler, 2006) and Article 78 of the UN Charter (1945) states that: 
 
“The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become 
Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based 
on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.” 
 
However, an absolute conception of sovereignty is at odds with any intervention 
that assumes any authority, as under the Westphalian conception of the state 
sovereignty is dependent on authority (Krasner, 1999). Therefore, any 
intervention negates sovereignty. In the 1990s, interventions were mainly 
justified in terms of humanitarian justice (Ayoob, 2002). These were in direct 
conflict with the dominant perception of sovereignty and that expressed in the 
UN Charter (Chandler, 2006). The issues inherent in this became apparent in 
Bosnia. UN peacekeepers were mobilised to undertake humanitarian aid (Helton, 
2000), but were hamstrung by the sovereignty conditions in the UN Charter and 
prohibition of “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state [in the UN]” (UN, 1945, Article 2). Ayoob 
(2002) postulates that if the UN mission had been willing to be more active and 
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even contradict the UN charter, a great deal of bloodshed could have been 
avoided. These issues necessitated a change in the definition of sovereignty.  
 
Over time, a new conception of sovereignty developed; one that sees it as a 
continuum rather than an absolute. A state’s sovereignty is dependent on its 
performance: if the state does not meet certain performance criteria international 
actors will intervene and subvert a degree of sovereignty (Schwarz, 2005).  Zaum 
(2009) describes five elements in which these performance criteria fit: 
 
- Administrative effectiveness 
- Human rights 
- Democratisation 
- Rule of law 
- Establishment of a free market economy 
 
If the state fails to perform in these areas, its authority will be ceded to other 
actors that can. International actors taking authority in any of the five elements 
subverts sovereignty. This new conception of sovereignty as a responsibility to 
meet certain criteria is set out in the 2001 The Responsibility to Protect Report: 
 
“It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: 
externally to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to 
respect the integrity and basic rights of all the people within the state… 
Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimal content of good 
international citizenship. “ 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, 
p.8) 
 
The report goes on to explain that if states do not meet their internal obligations, 
external intervention, even contrary to the external responsibility of respecting 
sovereignty, is justified. While, such a justification seems to only apply to the 
human rights element of the five set out by Zaum (2009) the five are interrelated. 
For example, Collier (2007) explains how economic growth through a free market 
economy is vital for reducing human-rights-violating conflicts. 
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Denying Accountability 
This redefinition of sovereignty, integral to liberal democratic peacebuilding, 
paradoxically rests its authority in systems that are undemocratic and not 
accountable to the people. Chandler (2006) explains how the redefinition of 
sovereignty has eroded ties between those in power and systems of 
accountability; the politicians (who have largely ceded authority) are subject to 
the accountability mechanisms, not the staff of the intervention. Through its 
focus on conditional sovereignty, peacebuilding has become “practically imperial” 
(Heathershaw, 2008, p.620). Additionally, by focusing on institutions it has 
become a largely technocratic process. Through obtaining legitimacy from the 
host government and focusing on building institutions via capacity development 
the intervention itself becomes depoliticised, as it becomes part of the impersonal 
state operations.  As put by Heathershaw (2008), statebuilding is a highly 
political endeavour. This is hidden by its technocratisation, which disguises its 
political motivations behind a veil of ‘neutral’ scientific and technical expertise. In 
this process, the work done becomes the realm of technical experts, something 
that the general citizen cannot meaningfully contribute to (McKinlay et al., 2013). 
Chandler (2006) describes the statebuilding exercise as successful in its goals. He 
terms this ‘empire in denial’. This new empire is denied through the distancing of 
external actors from the political sphere and the needs of accountability, while 
still allowing international actors to pursue their agendas (Chandler, 2007). The 
portrayal of peacebuilding as a technical exercise in statebuilding is central to 
this. 
 
In Bosnia, this empire in denial has had its ultimate expression in the successful 
mobilisation of the rhetoric that Europeanisation is a civilising process, and that 
the adoption of the seemingly apolitical reforms necessary for EU membership is 
the proper course of action (Chandler, 2006; Jeffery, 2008; Richmond et al., 
2011). The goal of EU membership (and the associated reforms) has become 
perceived as the true course of action.  However, the transfer of sovereignty 
involved with adopting the necessary reforms destabilises the state due to the loss 
of accountability and public involvement. In Bosnia, this led to increasing 
accusations that the international community was behaving like a ‘European Raj’ 
(Belloni, 2012).   
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Focus on the Western Modern State 
The other main criticism of the liberal peacebuilding agenda is that it is too 
focused on the development of a Western modern state and this undermines the 
civil peace. Practitioners ignore cultural underpinnings and non-state systems 
(Bendaña and Chopra, 2013). Richmond et al. (2011) describe the main priorities 
of the current peacebuilding agenda to be the development of security, the 
Westphalian sovereign state, human rights, the market, and the rule of law. 
Another example of the priorities is Zaum’s (2009) performance criteria outlined 
earlier.  The modern Westphalian state is a product of centuries of incremental 
development that was dependant on the specific geographic, historic, and 
economic conditions that made it possible (Clements et al., 2007; OECD, 2010). 
Consideration must also be given to the centuries of on-going warfare in Europe 
that characterised state development, as states had to agree to develop 
accountability mechanisms for the right to extract taxes to fund warfare 
(Fukuyama, 2007; Tilly, 1985). Statebuilders who do not acknowledge this and do 
not consider the local circumstances risk creating institutions that do not meet 
local needs, are not seen as legitimate by the population and are therefore 
ineffective.  
 
We see the reasons for this in path-dependence theory. Here initial dynamic 
processes generate self-reinforcing outcomes in which a change in direction 
becomes increasingly difficult, due to barriers becoming ingrained in political 
institutions (Belloni, 2012). Essentially, history matters. When looking at the 
impacts of path-dependence on development and institutional reform, Prado and 
Trebilcock (2009) found that path-dependence, and the importance it places on 
context, reduces any blueprint best-practice approach of institutional 
development to sub-optimum levels. Additionally, they found that due to the high 
cost of shifting a pre-determined course, ambitious and holistic reforms in the 
political, bureaucratic, and legal areas carry significant risks of failure. This 
translates into challenges for the wide reaching and holistic reforms pursued 
under the liberal and institutional focus of contemporary peacebuilding. 
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Challenges that are compounded when statebuilders ignore the local contextual 
factors affecting path-dependence. 
 
An often-ignored contextual factor is that in many developing countries that have 
been the recipients of international interventions, the state has never enjoyed a 
position of unbridled superiority.  The state has had to share its legitimacy, 
authority, and capacity regarding the legitimate use of violence, distribution of 
welfare, and political representation with a plethora of local institutions (Boege et 
al., 2009). Peacebuilders ignore these important contextual factors at their peril. 
In the case of Bosnia and general EU peacebuilding, Richmond et al. (2011) state 
that it has “become increasingly concerned with security, rights, democratisation, 
rule of law, civil society and marketisation as they are externally, not contextually, 
defined” (p.464). Interventions that ignore these contextual factors and focus 
only on Western definitions risk becoming paternalistic, racist, and exploitative 
(Crawford, 1993).  Additionally, Clements et al. (2007) postulate that without 
proper conventions or institutions to guide economic, political, and social 
behaviour, locals can become caught between a weak formal system and an 
informal system undermined due to its exclusion. All this destabilises the state 
and limits the chances of success of any peacebuilding exercises.  
 
One of the best examples of the problems with excluding the local level occurred 
in Timor-Leste. On 15 September 1999, the UN Security Council authorised 
intervention in the country due to a deteriorating humanitarian situation and 
reports of widespread human rights violations (Cotton, 2001). This conflict arose 
due to the destabilising effect of the Indonesian withdrawal from the country and 
the collapse of the governing apparatus (Chopra, 2002). The initial UN mission’s 
focus was on peace-maintenance, but this soon evolved into a mission of top-
down, technocratic statebuilding and governorship (Richmond, 2011). Wallis 
(2012) explains that the liberal peace model (constituting democratisation, the 
rule of law, human rights, and free-market economies i.e. the liberal peace 
consensus) followed too rigid a model, and did not engage with locals. This has 
led to the neglecting of local participation, favouring international interests over 
local ones, and the development of insecure institutions (Stanley, 2007; Wallis, 
2012). As suggested by Chopra (2002), the UN intervention “gave birth to a failed 
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state” (p.999). Stanley (2007) describes how despite the presence of local groups 
working to establish schools, rebuilding houses, and providing health after the 
conflict, some UN workers proceeded like these groups did not exist. It is 
examples like this that give credence to Chopra’s (2002) assert that the exclusion 
of the local level has hindered efforts to strengthen the state. 
 
This failure became apparent during the crisis in 2006, in which an estimated 
150,000 people were displaced, at least 37 were killed, the rule of law broke 
down, property was destroyed, and crowded refugee camps formed due to conflict 
between the police and armed forces (Stanley, 2007; Vieira, 2006). During this 
conflict a new societal division emerged, previously unknown to international 
actors, that of Loromonu (east) and Loprosae (west), in which ideas of the police 
as western and the military as eastern solidified (Simonsen, 2009).  Youth 
disenfranchised over rising poverty also exacerbated the conflict (Stanley, 2007). 
The reluctance of international actors to engage with local systems (facilitated by 
the accountability gap allowed by the redefinition of sovereignty and 
technocratisation) led to the development of institutions not legitimate to locals. 
Writing in 2011, Richmond stated that church, family, or international 
organisations were the first point of call, not the state. This problem can only be 
solved by the involvement of local systems and the development of a hybrid 
system (Boege et al. 2009). If the UN staff working in Timor-Leste had been more 
flexible in their approach and more willing to engage meaningfully with locals 
perhaps the Loromonu-Loprosae divide may have been identified earlier and 
better resolved. At the least, law and order institutions, if better tailored to local 
contexts, may not have collapsed. 
 
Hybrid Systems 
In responding to the Western-centric focus of the contemporary peacebuilding 
agenda, authors such as Roberts (2008), Quigley (2009) and Andrieu (2010) call 
for an approach that works with local systems and institutions by building state-
society relations from the grassroots. Otherwise, locals are made to feel as if “they 
are being pushed to conform to outside notions of government and justice” 
(Talentino, 2007, p.153). These calls represent an emerging trend in the literature 
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regarding peacebuilding: calls to work towards the development of hybrid 
systems of governance.  Meagher (2012) defines hybrid governance as a term that 
describes how in fragile states the formal state apparatus operates alongside 
informal actors in the provision of services and the exercise of authority. Such an 
approach gives greater agency to indigenous peoples, gives them more 
acknowledgment, and makes them more visible. It is consistent with the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination as guaranteed in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008). The reality is that 
hybrid governance has emerged informally in many fragile states (Richmond, 
2011; Wallis, 2012).  
 
However, Meagher’s definition in referencing non-state processes as running 
alongside state processes focuses on an ends-based definition of hybridity: 
individuals are able to choose from state and non-state processes to get the best 
solution for them.  Wallis (2012) terms this ‘forum-shopping’ and hypothesises 
that it may undermine the uniformity of justice institutions and the rule of law, as 
they require uniform and consistent application. This can be seen in Somaliland 
where non-state conflict resolution systems engaged with weak state law and 
justice mechanisms to strengthen traditional authority and existing clan-based 
power structures (Bendaña and Chopra, 2013). Rather, authors such as Belloni 
(2012) and Wallis (2012) discuss hybrid systems as where the state and non-state 
systems meet, colonise each other, and develop institutions unique to the local 
circumstances. Studying hybrid systems can give important insight into 
peacebuilding dynamics: using them can lead to a more robust and lasting peace 
(Belloni, 2012). 
 
An example of such a system is the village courts of Papua New Guinea, 
established by the  Village Courts Act of 1973 (Scaglion, 1990). There are over 
1000 courts and they service 82 percent of the country’s rural area (Westermark, 
1991). The magistrates of these courts are local people who have a good 
knowledge of custom, and the community trusts them to deliberate fairly (Evans 
et al., 2010). These courts are legislated to apply custom in their deliberations and 
de-emphasise the role of government, instead focusing on procedural informality 
(Westermark, 1991; Scaglion, 1990). They have been largely successful in their 
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mandate despite some concerns, such as a lack of definitions regarding local 
custom (Evans et al., 2010). This shows the benefit of hybridity, especially in 
delivering services to remote areas such as the mountainous rural areas of Papua 
New Guinea. Additionally, allowing local level, minor, disputes to be resolved at 
local level courts in customary ways leaves higher-level courts free to deal with 
other matters.   
 
The questions that are discussed on hybridity often relate to what degree (and 
how) these relationships should be formalised, and what the strengths and 
weaknesses of such an approach are (Wallis, 2012; Clements et al., 2007). 
Regarding the question of how to formalise hybrid governance Clements et al. 
(2007) focus on three areas that need addressing to bring together the state and 
non-state: 
 
- Substitution: Identification of equivalent state and non-state systems 
- Complementarity: Identification of areas where non-state and state 
overlap 
- Incompatibility: Identification of state and non-state approaches that 
conflict 
 
In such a structured approach to bringing the two sides together, a key role of any 
intervention would be that of facilitating the required discussions between the 
state and the non-state. However, Belloni (2012) reminds us that hybridity is a 
system of tensions and antagonism between the actors. He goes on to say that, it 
is from this very antagonism that can lead to new ways of resolving conflict. 
Naturally, this creates a very complex set of negotiations when working towards 
hybridity.  
 
Peacebuilding Summary 
The liberal peacebuilding agenda, as seen in the liberal peace consensus, has 
established itself as the paramount contemporary peacebuilding method. 
Contained within it though the civil peace is the possibility for bottom-up 
approaches based on local knowledge. However, the focus is on institutional 
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development, capacity building, and developing a liberal democratic peace by 
working with the host government. The redefinition of sovereignty from the 
absolute conception embodied in the UN Charter established after the Second 
World War, made this possible by solidifying the legitimacy of international 
interventions. However, this redefinition has been criticised as separating those 
in power (those in the intervention) from accountability systems. The 
technocratisation of peacebuilding further distances the intervention from 
accountability measures and hides its political nature. The states built are also 
criticised as too focused on the Westphalian modern state. This is at the exclusion 
of local level institutions, context, and people; leading to the development of weak 
institutions not seen as legitimate by the populace they are meant to serve. 
Moving forward from these criticisms, some authors focus on the importance of 
developing hybrid systems of governance. These approaches give more agency to 
local people and are hoped to lead to a more robust peace.  
 
Security Sector Reform and Strengthening the Rule of 
Law 
While this research focuses on the development of the rule of law, international 
interventions also pursue another mutually dependant process. Together, it and 
the rule of law are seen as integral for establishing the conditions for democracy, 
peace and the state to flourish: this is security sector reform (SSR) (Schwarz, 
2005; Faundez and Janse, 2012). Therefore, we cannot understand the rule of law 
without considering SSR. As Schröder and Kode (2012) explain, they are 
interdependent and the development of one cannot succeed without the other. 
This section looks at this relationship closely, seeking insight into the dominant 
approaches for their development, issues with this, and suggestions for 
improvement.   
 
The Relationship  
The state that fails to protect its citizens calls into question its entire existence 
(Goldsmith, 2002). Consequently, essential to the development of the state and 
the rule of law is the establishment of the monopoly on violence to a legitimate 
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institution (Stromseth et al., 2006; Beswick, 2009; Andrieu, 2010).  SSR is about 
forming its core components into such legitimate and democratically managed 
bodies (Schröder and Kode, 2012). SSR aims to restore the monopoly on violence 
to the state. It creates the preconditions for the rule of law by allowing the 
enforcement of compliance (OECD, 2010). However, the security sector also 
requires the rule of law. The OECD (2007) defines the security sector as 
including: 
 
- Core security actors: Armed forces, the police, and intelligence services 
- Security management and oversight bodies: Ministries of internal 
affairs, financial management bodies, and public complaints 
commissions 
- Justice and law enforcement institutions: The judiciary, corrections, 
and traditional justice systems 
- Non-statutory security forces: Private security companies and private 
militia 
 
The establishment of the rule of law gives legitimacy to these components and is 
especially central to the judicial and law enforcement aspects (Lundy and 
McGovern, 2008). Stromseth et al. (2006) define the rule of law as: 
 
“A state of affairs in which the state successfully monopolizes the means of 
violence, and in which most people, most of the time, choose to resolve 
disputes in a manner consistent with procedurally fair, neutral, and 
universally applicable rules, and in a manner that respects fundamental 
human rights norms” 
(p.78) 
  
As indicated in the above quote, implicit in the idea of the rule of law is the 
internalisation of the concepts it represents, especially concerning how the 
decision-making process is undertaken (Nagan and Jacobs, 2012). With 
internalisation people no longer question the right of the rule of law and its 
appendages to primacy, and impose self-regulation to align with its principles. 
Therefore, the achievement of this internalisation is essential for ensuring the 
legitimacy of the security sector. 
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The Process 
One of the core components of any intervention is developing a strong and 
efficient police force free from corruption. A key element of which is bolstering 
police visibility and presence, this requires providing equipment and financial 
support to the police (Albrecht and Buur, 2009; Hill et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Goldsmith (2002) states that a lack of resources also contributes to corruption 
and low police moral, making equipment and financial support all the more 
important. Another important factor is public image. Celador (2005) describes a 
reform undertaken for the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International actors 
initiated a police certification process, some of the criteria including education, 
training, and the absence of war crime convictions. The aim of this was to restore 
the legitimacy of the police by restoring its image. However, establishing the rule 
of law and addressing all the elements of SSR described by the OECD (2007) 
requires a broad, whole of government approach (Schröder and Kode, 2012). 
 
The concepts of SSR and the rule of law are intertwined and there is considerable 
overlap in the approaches used to pursue both (Faundez and Janse, 2012; 
Heupel, 2012). As explained above the establishment of the rule of law helps give 
legitimacy to the security sector (Lundy and McGovern, 2008). However, 
strengthening the security sector creates the preconditions for developing the rule 
of law (OECD, 2010). In practice, coercive force through the military and the 
police achieves the initial security sector strengthening in post-conflict 
environments. Andrieu (2010) described this, as seen in the previous chapter, as 
the perceived necessity of illiberal acts to establish liberal democracy. This creates 
the preconditions needed to develop the rule of law, which gives then legitimacy 
to the security sector.  
 
The development of the rule of law and a rules-based environment within the 
state itself amongst the politicians and civil service is also key target. In 
discussing the importance of the rule of law for establishing a state’s right to 
sovereignty, Ghani et al. (2005) explain “it is the constitution of the state itself 
through rules and its continuing subjection to them that marks the routinisation 
 
 
38 
 
of the rule of law” (p.9). Rotberg (2004) describes an important element of this, 
where one of the most important tools of statecraft is using rules to control how 
civil servants, politicians, and the public can interact with the state apparatus. 
This is establishing the ‘rules of the game’, or a rules-based environment within 
the state.  Gilman (2005) highlights how the development of codes of conduct can 
achieve this. They help guide and induce behaviour in developing countries, help 
make ‘ethical’ behaviour a habit, and they make an important statement about the 
commitment of the institution to professionalism. Inherent in this are the 
methods used to fight corruption. The development of proper checks and 
balances to combat corruption is essential to strengthening the judiciary and 
governance reform (Cao, 2007). If the rule of law is to be applied to wider society, 
the state needs to be a model example of how to abide by its principles.   
 
Finally, Wippman (2010) sets out what is broadly involved with developing the 
rule of law, it requires: 
 
“fostering effective, inclusive, and transparent governance structures; 
creating fair and independent judicial systems and responsible security 
forces; reforming and updating legal codes; and creating a widely shared 
public commitment to human rights and to using the new or reformed 
civic structures to resolve problems, rather than relying on violence or 
self-help.” 
(Wippman, 2010, p.366) 
 
This shows no shortage of other tasks for the intrepid peacebuilder. The last point 
set out by Wippman above regarding changing public commitments is probably 
the most difficult to achieve. This is because it requires challenging potentially 
internalised norms (a component not recognised by international actors (Brooks, 
2003)), and rearranging state-society relationships. This may be especially 
challenging if corruption is an issue, as perceived corruption can severally 
undermine efforts to build legitimacy in institutions (OECD, 2011). This creates 
another task in the development of the rule of law: the separation of rule of law-
based institutions from political processes described by Weingast (2010).  
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Criticisms 
A key group of criticisms of SSR and building the rule of law is the apparent 
reluctance to diverge from Western definitions and conceptions of institutional 
forms.  The core argument is that interventions take for granted how the 
institutions they are promoting developed over centuries of state-society 
interactions and bargaining in particular geographical, political, economic, and 
social circumstances (OECD, 2010; Schröder and Kode, 2012; Weingast, 2010). 
They do not give due regard to local contextual factors. What is worse, Bendaña 
and Chopra (2013) explain that integral to the liberal peacebuilding agenda 
regarding the rule of law, is the assumption that “once rule of law institutions 
were functional, other forms of justice and security would cease to exist” (p. 45). 
This assumes that the rule of law has an intrinsic right to be the paramount 
conflict resolution mechanism: it has some degree of intrinsic legitimacy that is 
recognised. However, in their research into gender equality, Pistor et al. (2010) 
show that this assumption does not hold and the authority of the rule of law is not 
globally legitimate. The rule of law is a cultural conception, its development 
depends on changing societal norms, and to assume that its development is 
intrinsically good and beneficial is imperialistic (Brooks, 2003). Essentially, this 
is the argument described in the previous chapter regarding peacebuilders giving 
insufficient attention to contextual factors, but applied to the SSR and rule of law 
arenas. Such a contextually blind approach can have three main negative impacts 
on conflict resolution as described below.  
 
First, not taking into account local political factors can facilitate corruption 
(OECD, 2011). Returning to Timor-Leste, Berg (2012) discusses how the weak 
institutions developed by the UN administration (weak for reasons described in 
the previous chapter) allowed the FRETILIN party, when it took over, to 
manipulate the weak institutions for their own favour. Of particular relevance, 
they were able to manipulate the military and police forces, contributing to the 
divide between the two described earlier and undermining the rule of law. 
Secondly, ignoring local contextual factors can severely hinder the ability of rule 
of law-based approaches to address certain cultural issues (Quigley, 2009). 
Discussing the role of women in Somaliland, Bendaña and Chopra (2013) show 
that the mainstream model focused on legal institutions has not improved the 
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position of women. There is little knowledge of state law and justice systems, and 
non-state systems based on cultural norms mainly deal with conflict. Some of 
these cultural norms are contrary to international human rights. For example, 
dealt with at the non-state level, in some places a virgin woman who is raped may 
be made to marry her attacker. Not engaging with cultural factors makes these 
issues invisible, because they do not make it to a formal court setting. Thirdly, the 
ignoring of local contextual factors implicitly privileges international notions of 
justice and legal process. Arenhövel (2008) questions whether the precedence 
given to these approaches is helpful, as it may force out more appropriate local 
methods. Another concern of this legalistic approach is that:  
 
“The overriding focus on redressing direct injustices against individuals 
(in the form of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity) tends to leave the injustices that caused the conflict 
untouched.” 
(Lundy and McGovern, 2008, p.274) 
 
By going in and pursuing what internationally is considered the main drivers of 
conflict, the real local factors are ignored. Conflict is always unique and there is 
no blueprint for how it can be solved. Highlighting this, Jeffrey (2011) explains 
that the highly legalistic approach and the opinions of legal experts have become 
prioritised over ideas of social healing and actors outside the legal area. 
 
Schröder and Kode (2012) put forward a significant criticism regarding the 
relationship between SSR and building the rule of law. Their argument is that 
strengthening security institutions and the promotion of mechanisms of 
legitimate control implicit in strengthening the rule of law are incompatible. This 
is because “the former aims to strengthen a state’s enforcement capacities, while 
the latter seeks to restrict them” (p.31). This is reinforced by Berg (2012), who 
states that especially in conflict-affected countries tensions between SSR and rule 
of law objectives can lead to human rights abuses, as the justice system cannot 
keep pace with arrests, or enforce security forces to follow regulations. The 
holistic nature of SSR and rule of law promotion also creates problems due to a 
lack of a significant knowledge base in both areas (Heupel, 2012). This means 
 
 
41 
 
that it is difficult to see the myriad of connections that require consideration 
when developing holistic and integrated approaches.  
 
Lastly, due to SSR and the rule of law being dependant on each other, there is a 
core contradiction. As explained, a functioning and legitimate security sector is 
necessary to establish the rule of law (OECD, 2010), while Lundy and McGovern 
(2008) explain that the rule of law is necessary for the security sector to be 
legitimate. If the security sector is not legitimate, it will only ever be coercive and 
unable to achieve meaningful internalisation of the rule of law, meaning the 
security sector cannot be legitimatised. As an example, it was discussed above 
that corruption undermines legitimacy in the rule of law. However, Mendonça 
and Fonseca (2012) show how the rule of law is the main tool used to fight 
corruption. How then can the rule of law be established to fight corruption if 
corruption undermines it? The traditional way round this, described earlier, is the 
use of coercive force to undertake liberal acts through illiberal means. This top-
down strategy is vulnerable however, as it is highly visible and coercive. This is 
the weakest form of power (explained more shortly). Its high visibility makes it 
vulnerable to opposition, highlighting a weak point in the development of the rule 
of law, one potentially exploited by vested interests. 
 
Bottom-up Approaches and Restorative Justice 
Similar to the argument around hybrid systems portrayed earlier, the inclusion of 
bottom-up and restorative justice practices are frequently talked about in 
developing a more appropriate place for the rule of law. A bottom-up approach 
involves local people at all stages of the justice process and resolves conflicts in 
ways that are applicable to them and their culture. It focuses on community needs 
and is committed to social justice (Richmond and Franks, 2008). Truth telling, 
participatory involvement, and putting communities at the centre of justice form 
the basis of such an approach. It can get at the meat of inter-community conflict, 
understand community dynamics, and generate discussion (Lundy and 
McGovern, 2008). Bottom-up approaches place greater emphasis on cultural 
norms and their creation and reproduction. Brooks (2003) recognises that it is 
only through working with these norms that the rule of law can be developed, as 
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the rule of law is but a group of cultural norms itself. Mixing of these norms can 
create a locally relevant form of the rule of law. An idea that is often central in this 
is the principle of restorative justice.  
 
Restorative justice involves a range of informal approaches that aim to meet the 
needs of both the offenders and victims. This often involves community-wide 
involvement, the restoration of balance, and the restoration of relationships 
(Delfau and Duff, 2011; Latimer et al., 2005). In their meta-analysis of 22 
restorative justice studies Laitmer et al. (2005) found that restorative approaches 
were generally more successful than standard approaches. However, Wenzel et al 
(2008) explain that due to the voluntary nature of restorative justice there is 
bound to be bias, as the mere act of participation (especially regarding offenders) 
already indicates a degree of success, a concern acknowledged by Laitmer et al. 
(2005). Wenzel et al. (2008) discuss how restorative justice is far more likely to 
succeed between people who share societal values and a group identity. This is 
because an offence by someone who shares the same values is more likely seen as 
a violation of these values that can, and should, be restored. Conversely, an 
offender who does not seem to share values is more likely seen as an illegitimate 
challenger of power and status, and, more likely to receive retributive justice. A 
potential avenue for addressing this issue can be seen in Braithwaite’s (2002) 
argument for ensuring accountability in restorative justice through adherence to a 
set of broad, top-down imposed principles. These principles are contestable from 
the bottom-up and this contestation makes them meaningful. Examples include 
maximising standards of restoring human dignity, restoring freedom, and 
emotional restoration. However, care is needed not to romanticise the local level, 
and nor to reproduce local power relations that are detrimental (Paris, 2010). 
Regardless, transitional justice is an important notion in the development of 
hybrid conceptions of the rule of law. 
 
Rule of Law Summary 
The SSR and rule of law reforms undertaken by most international interventions 
have tended to follow a pre-determined approach. They have sought to strengthen 
the relevant core state institutions, such as the police force and the judiciary. In 
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doing so, they fit into the liberal peacebuilding agenda described in part one of 
this chapter. The close relationship between SSR and the development of the rule 
of law necessitates a diverse range of strategies to ensure success, but most 
mainstream ones focus on the state and its institutions. These approaches have 
drawn criticism, especially for their Western-centric assumptions about how 
justice and the rule of law should operate. Their reliance on coercive force to carry 
out the initial work is also a vulnerability, as such power is highly visible and a 
lodestone for opposition.  Echoing the calls for increased hybridity, the 
integration of bottom-up, restorative, and other contextually relevant approaches 
into the rule of law edifice are the new ways forward in developing legitimacy.  
 
Defining Legitimacy and its Development 
Legitimacy is a term that is gaining more and more traction in the development 
community, no doubt soon to be raised up to the same level as terms such as 
accountability, ownership, and participation. Hill et al. (2012) describe legitimacy 
as the fundamental foundation that forms the basis of people’s choice to engage 
with different actors. Therefore, legitimacy is the ultimate goal when undertaking 
the institutional development central to peacebuilding, as it is only when 
institutions are legitimate that people will begin to take their primacy for granted 
and internalise their rules. However, there are two conflicting views regarding 
whether anything can be intrinsically legitimate. This research rejects any claim 
to intrinsic legitimacy, and therefore, the process of developing it necessitates 
diverse strategies to address all facets of legitimacy. These strategies are made 
visible by considering a modified version of Lukes’ three dimensions of power.  
 
The Intrinsic and Non-intrinsic Views of Legitimacy 
The intrinsic view is where certain institutions and political orders have 
legitimacy inherently built into them (Anderson, 2012). They represent the ‘true’ 
way of ordering and representing society. For the West, this emerges out of the 
rationalistic tradition where rational investigation can uncover truth. Therefore, 
institutions based on this idea are intrinsically legitimate as they embody this 
process, piggybacking on its legitimacy. Paris (2004) reflects this idea when he 
highlights that in peacebuilding there are certain non-negotiable elements of the 
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state. They are non-negotiable because they are intrinsically legitimate; hence, 
their development is enough to ensure their place in society.  The fundamental 
determinant for legitimacy then becomes how well the institutions perform.  On 
the surface, Tyler’s (2003) process-based model of compliance with the law, as 
presented in Figure 2, represents this: 
 
 
Figure 2: Process-based regulation (Tyler, 2003) 
 
Tyler sees a perception of fair process as the fundamental unit guiding adherence 
to the rule of law: if you get the process right, legitimacy will develop. This 
represents a procedural view of justice where the trust amongst the population, 
developed by proper process, confers legitimacy on the justice system and 
prepares people to obey institutional commands (Hough et al., 2010). Modern 
legal process in the West rests on rationalism and the idea that adjudication is a 
rational exercise (Chapman, 2000; Gee and Webber, 2013).  A fair and rational 
process will then deliver fair outcomes, making the rule of law intrinsically 
legitimate when functioning properly. However, the definition of ‘fair’ is 
normatively determined in a society (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler, 2003). Talentino 
(2007) describes how local perceptions shape what a just action is viewed to be. 
What one sees as just represents a belief in a particular way of organising society 
and relationships, a belief being something that one accepts to exist or be true 
(Merriam-Webster, 2013). As these beliefs change so do what people view as fair 
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and just; therefore requiring different processes to ensure legitimacy and 
compliance with the law.  
 
This is the non-intrinsic view of legitimacy. It exposes the culturally constricted 
nature of the rules on which we order society. Therefore there can be no intrinsic 
legitimacy, as what is legitimate in one society may not be in another due to 
differences in beliefs of what is fair and just (Anderson, 2012; Pitor et al., 2010). 
Foucault’s description of the state offers insight here. He describes the state as a 
variable phenomenon based on multiple force interactions, which form the 
moving body of power relations; these power relations crystallise into objects like 
state apparatuses, social norms, and bodies of law (Foucault in Jessop, 2007). 
Under the non-intrinsic view, the development of legitimacy becomes a struggle 
of force interactions to establish what is true. Laclau and Mouffle (2001) describe 
this as the battle of different discourses to establish new systems of truth. Success 
occurs when one discourse establishes a hegemony over the principles for 
organising society (Sutherland, 2005). It crystallises into a new social truth. The 
conception of legitimacy presented in the OECD (2010) report The State’s 
Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity gives particular 
emphasis to the importance of beliefs in their four dimensional view of 
legitimacy, comprising of: 
 
- Process legitimacy, in which the state is tied to a system of agreed rules 
that organise participation and produce binding decisions 
- Performance legitimacy, tied to the effectiveness and quality of state 
services and goods 
- Shared beliefs, shaped by societal factors such as ideology, religion, 
culture and traditions, also includes charismatic legitimacy deriving 
from particular individuals 
- International legitimacy, from the recognition of a state’s sovereignty 
and adherence to international norms 
 
This is the conception of legitimacy used in this research. It sees it not as a simple 
concept and these four elements reflect this. Building legitimacy is about 
addressing all of these four elements and all four are connected in many ways, 
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some interactions being mutually reinforcing and others detrimental (OECD, 
2010). Understanding the development of legitimacy in these elements 
necessitates a suitably diverse framework; for this Lukes’ three faces of power 
offers insight. 
 
The Three Dimensions of Domination 
The three faces, or dimensions, of power, is a theoretical framework for how 
actors exercise power to achieve their goals, originally established in Lukes’ 1974 
book Power: a Radical View. In the 2005 second edition, Lukes expands on his 
original theory by acknowledging that the three dimensions of power are not 
absolute. Rather, they represent a conception of ‘power-over’: they describe the 
means utilised to meet certain ends (Lukes, 2oo5; Swartz, 2005). This is opposed 
to what Morriss (2006) describes as the true conception of power, where power is 
the capacity to meet certain ends. For example, it is possible to be powerless (lack 
capacity), but not be dominated, something not possible in the original 
conception of the three faces of power. Morriss (2006) calls for the three 
dimensions of power to be called what they are, three dimensions of domination. 
Perhaps this is a semantical quibble, but one that is useful in avoiding ambiguity 
and hence followed.  
 
What are the three faces of domination? Gaventa (2006) adapts a table from 
VeneKlasen and Miler (2002); this table is further adapted here to describe the 
three faces or dimensions: 
 
Lukes 
(2005) 
Gaventa 
(2006) 
Focus Description 
One 
dimensional 
power 
Visible power: 
observable 
decision-making 
• behaviour 
• decision-making 
• (key) issues 
• Observable (overt) conflict 
• (subjective) interests 
The formal rules, 
structures, 
authorities, 
institutions and 
processes that shape 
decision-making, 
including the control 
over resources. 
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Two 
dimensional 
power 
Hidden power: 
setting the 
political agenda 
• decision-making and non-
decision-making 
• issues and potential issues 
• observable (overt or 
covert) conflict 
• (subjective) interests 
Controlling who is at 
the table and what 
can be discussed. 
Decisions are 
prevented  on 
potential issues. 
Three 
dimensional 
power 
Invisible power: 
shaping 
meaning and 
what is 
acceptable 
• Decision-making and 
control over political 
agenda 
• Issues and potential issues 
• Observable (overt or 
covert) and latent conflict 
• Subjective or real interests 
 
Shaping psychological 
and ideological 
boundaries of 
participation. 
Influences how 
individuals think 
about their place in 
the world. 
 
Table 1: The three dimensions of domination (adapted from Gaventa, 2006 and 
Lukes, 2005) 
 
An important part of the three faces of domination is the idea that as we move 
towards the third dimension the exercise of domination becomes less visible, and 
through being less visible it is more effective (Swartz, 2005). When considering 
the attribution of the intentionality to dominate, Lukes (2005) acknowledges that 
power can shape people’s behaviour without being intentional. Dowding (2006) 
puts a more detailed approach forward. He explains that when someone acts in 
ignorance of the effects of their actions they are not dominating. However, if they 
are ignorant, but should not be, they are dominating. Finally he explains that 
anyone aware of how institutions shape behaviour through domination and do 
not seek to change those structures for the better is part of the system of 
domination. This is obviously variable, depending on the capacity of the person to 
change the institution. 
 
Expanding the Third Dimension 
This dimension is worth further mention because of its complexity. It relates 
closely to Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Governmentality takes 
government to mean something that: 
 
“refers to conduct, or an activity meant to shape, guide, or affect the 
conduct of people. Conduct takes on meaning beyond the form of leading 
and directing. It also refers to the ‘conduct of oneself’ where a sense of 
self-governance is a guiding force.” 
(Huff, 2007, p. 389) 
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In this, the role of government and governmentality involves: 
 
“the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
security as its essential technical instrument.” 
(Foucault, 2007, p.108)  
 
From these ideas comes the famous definition of government as the ‘conduct of 
conduct.’ This is a wide-ranging term and covers both self-government and the 
governing of others (Lemke, 2000). Central to the third face of domination is the 
establishment of such self-governance and the form of personal conduct. The 
achievement of this internalisation of the rules necessitates the establishment of 
certain beliefs about what is acceptable and true. Fairclough (2001) describes a 
similar concept in his members’ resources, being the set of rules that people draw 
upon in their everyday lives to interpret issues and conduct themselves. The third 
dimension of domination, from an institutional point of view, aims to define what 
the conduct of conduct/members’ resources of a society is/are. 
 
However, governing people is not just getting them to do what the governor 
wants; rather it is an equilibrium between techniques of domination that shape 
how individuals act upon themselves, and the effects of the self when integrated 
into systems of domination (Foucault, 2007). Institutions are also vulnerable to 
the third dimension of domination, as individuals capable of exerting force 
inhabit them. However, asymmetrical power relations between those in power 
and the subordinates, facilitated by the technologies of government that 
systematise and regulate power relations, make institutional domination possible 
(Lemke, 2000).  There are many different technologies, but one of particular 
importance is the mobilisation of discourse. 
 
Language is the primary way we understand society, but language is not neutral. 
It develops out of the specific historical, cultural, and political forms of society to 
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form particular discourses (Anker, 2007). This research takes a strong (but not 
the strongest) view of discourse as a: 
 
“Connected set of statements, concepts, terms and expressions which 
constitutes a way of talking and writing about a particular issue, this 
frames the way people understand and act with respect to that issue.” 
(Watson as cited in Alvesson and Karreman, 2000, p. 1131) 
 
The key word in the above quote is ‘frames’. This does allow other factors, such as 
free will, to play a role in cognition, but such factors operate within the finite 
space established by discourse. Discourse can then be a powerful tool to shape 
how people see the world. Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), when discussing the 
development of nationalism, highlight the importance of taken-for-grantedness 
because it makes things invisible. Discourse is often taken for granted, hence 
making its influence invisible and accordingly powerful. The deferral of 
references achieves the actual mobilisation of discourse. Cooper (1993) describes 
this as where a statement gets its rhetorical power through indirectly referencing 
the real world, indirectly because the statement is “refracted through an 
imaginary, or imaginatively presented one [world]” (p.198). Over time, this can 
transform a meaningless statement into truth. The portrayal of a threat is 
particularly powerful in this respect. In their research, Hjerm and Schnabel 
(2010) show that external threats are important drivers in the development of 
nationalism. However, with the modern geopolitical situation and the 
abandoning of a territorial conception of security in favour of an individual, 
internal one (Longo, 2013), there has been a shift to focus on internal threats 
rather than external.  
 
Legitimacy Summary 
Legitimacy is a complex and debated concept. This research rejects any claims 
that institutions or concepts can be intrinsically legitimate. Rather, it views 
legitimacy as being dependent on the culturally constructed shared beliefs within 
a society about what is true. Developing legitimacy then requires a holistic 
approach that addresses these shared beliefs, while also paying attention to the 
importance of proper process, the delivery of acceptable outputs, and the 
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importance of international recognition and norms. A modified version of Lukes’ 
three faces of power, with a closer focus on the third face and discourse, is offered 
as a way of understanding the strategies used by institutions to develop the four 
types of legitimacy set out in the OECD (2010) report. The research uses this lens 
to uncover the strategies used by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands to develop legitimacy in the rule of law.  
 
Conclusion 
A theme that has run throughout the chapter, from issues with the contemporary 
peacebuilding agenda and approaches to developing the rule of law to the 
definition of legitimacy used, is the importance of contextual understanding. The 
consideration of the place of contextual understanding in Solomon Islands 
peacebuilding is, therefore, paramount if we are to assess the sustainability of 
gains made. The other issues discussed also necessitate consideration in a 
Solomon Islands context to see if they have an effect on the four types of 
legitimacy. These four types of process, output, shared-belief, and international 
legitimacy together necessitate diverse strategies to develop them all.  This 
chapter has presented a picture of the dominant contemporary approaches for 
doing this regarding the rule of law, both broadly through the liberal peace 
consensus and focused through SSR and rule of law reform. Given the 
international community’s penchant for best practice and internationally agreed 
frameworks, these dominant approaches provide clues for the development of 
legitimacy in Solomon Islands. 
 
As described by Foucault there are particular technologies of government that 
facilitate domination. Domination is further broken down into the three different 
dimensions for this research. Utilising Lukes’ power over resources, power over 
process, and power over meaning, gives structure and clarity to the complex array 
of technologies of government and the messy business of institutional 
domination. This chapter has looked at just some of the considerable literature on 
peacebuilding. It has focused on the liberal peacebuilding agenda’s toolbox of 
technologies of domination, issues with them, and attempts to challenge (or 
maybe just reshape) their form through hybrid approaches. However, research 
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into peacebuilding and the rule of law done primarily through a domination-
based lens, while giving due regard to legitimacy is rarer. This research aims to fill 
that gap to develop a more nuanced understanding of the development of the rule 
of law in post-conflict environments. The following chapter sets out the research 
methodology used to achieve this.  
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
Having established the contextual, historical, theoretical, and empirical 
foundations of the research this chapter presents how the research was 
undertaken. A well-designed methodology is critical for successful research. This 
requires close consideration of data collection methods, data analysis methods, 
any possible ambiguities in the research, and ethical considerations. 
Furthermore, Rose (2007) reminds us that research is discursive and reflects 
certain relationships and assumptions. For this reason, it is important to reflect 
on what these are. This requires an investigation of the epistemological 
foundations of the study, for this establishes how the researcher and the research 
interacts with other bodies of information. At the more personal level, a look at 
one’s personality reveals potential sources that may influence the research. Such 
important considerations are presented first. 
 
Epistemology 
This research was within the paradigm of post-positivism, where reality is outside 
the human mind, but due to the constraining nature of language and the complex 
nature of nature, one can never be certain about a theory. Additionally, post-
positivism acknowledges that theory affects any collection of data and cannot be 
completely neutral (Willis, 2007). Post-positivists recognise the ability of social 
and political structures to shape and hold power over individuals. This forms an 
important part of how the world is seen and how knowledge is constructed 
(Schwandt, 2007). There is no spot for the researcher to look out from that is free 
from bias generating influences (Mansvelt and Berg, 2005). The post-positivist 
approach acknowledges that the complex relationships implicit in the research 
can theoretically be explained rationally, and therefore neutralised, but such an 
understanding is outside the scope of human ability (Willis, 2007). Still, one has 
an obligation to move towards the area of least bias and attempt to make those 
biases that remain, visible.  
 
Consideration of the effects of language is critical to post-positivism and it is one 
of the group of theories associated with the linguistic turn. The links between 
poststructuralism and post-positivism are particularly important.  For example, 
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one of the founding figures in post-positivism, Ferdinand de Saussure, argued 
that the act of classification is not neutral due to the constructed nature of 
language (Manjikian, 2013). As classification is a fundamental aspect of any 
attempt at a mechanistic and rational understanding of a phenomenon, these 
attempts also lack neutrality. Poststructuralists hold that “the relationship 
between society and culture is mediated through language: humans are 
configured and given cultural significance through language” (Kitchin and Tate, 
2000, p.17). Therefore, the very language used limits the abilities of humans to 
obtain a truly rationalistic understanding of the world. The best one can do to 
escape this trap is to acknowledge power relationships, assumptions, and sources 
of bias in the research. 
 
A post-positivist epistemology has two main implications for the research. First, 
regarding data analysis, the recognition that language both directly and indirectly 
shapes behaviour (indirectly through the influence of social and political 
institutions built upon discourse) necessitates a data analysis technique that 
makes these relationships visible. For this reason, discourse analysis becomes a 
significant factor in determining the direct effects of language on legitimacy in the 
rule of law. Content analysis allows investigation of the indirect effects through 
institutions. The second implication is that such recognition of the power of 
language necessitates the practice of reflexivity by the researcher. One’s 
background shapes how they will interpret a particular issue, and such 
interpretation will not be value neutral (Willis, 2007). “Knowledge does not, 
according to a post-structuralist perspective, exist independently of the people 
who created it” (Mansvelt and Berg, 2005, p.257). The researcher must then 
understand that how they interpret data is shaped by the discourses they have 
been exposed to and that these influence the final words they put to paper. 
Essentially, post-positivism necessitates a thorough consideration of 
positionality. 
 
Positionality 
As Lukes (2005) explains, the most potent influences are those that are not 
visible, but making them visible goes a long way in negating their effects. This 
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section attempts to outline the main factors influencing my positionality as a 
researcher. The following table (Table 2) shows this attempt. To do this, two 
hypothetical extremes of each factor are presented: one a complete acceptance of 
the factor, the other a complete rejection. My personal reality is located at some 
indistinguishable point along a continuum between these two extremes. 
Presenting each extreme is useful in that it makes visible what the forms of 
influence could be. It provides a list of the most significant tints that could creep 
into one’s analytical lens, thus, making it easier to avoid these influences. 
 
Factor Extreme Acceptance  Extreme Rejection 
European history of 
colonialism  
- Denial of negative impacts, 
such as small pox 
- View of aid recipients as 
impassive objects of 
benevolent Western 
assistance 
- Denial of benefits, such as 
reduced maternal mortality 
- Romanticisation of 
traditional societies 
Western, 
rationalistic 
education 
- Rejection of other 
epistemologies 
- Assumption of neutrality 
- Marginalisation of non 
‘experts’ 
- Adoption of a mechanistic 
totality 
- Epistemological nihilism 
- Rejection of the many 
benefits science does bring 
Age - Over valuing of one’s 
personal abilities 
- Overly ambitious challenges 
to status quo 
- Marginalisation of 
experience 
- Under valuing one’s 
personal abilities  
- Reluctance to challenge 
status quo 
- Dogmatic deference to 
experience 
Gender - Male chauvinism - Female chauvinism 
Table 2: Main factors influencing my positionality 
 
Despite the benefits of the researcher giving due regard to their positionality, 
there are fundamental debates in the development field about the ability of an 
outsider to portray other peoples’ culture (Momsen, 2006). Context is crucially 
important to all research involving social interaction and needs to be understood 
as best as possible (Brydon, 2006). As an outsider, I only have a limited 
understanding of the cultural setting. One of the primary objectives of the semi-
structured interviews was to improve this understanding and I tailored questions 
accordingly. Informal interactions with Solomon Islanders were also vital in 
gaining a situated understanding of the context; whether this was chats at a café, 
or interaction with villagers in the rural areas.  
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Data Collection 
Document analysis was the primary data collection technique used in the 
research. These documents were used to establish the physical ways the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was affecting legitimacy in the 
rule of law and to provide a source of discourse to understand more subtle 
influences. The strengths and weakness of document analysis are summarised in 
Table 3: 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Can be reviewed repeatedly 
- Unobtrusive and not created as a result 
of the case study 
- Grounded in the locality 
- Provides useful background and insight 
into an issue and people 
- Relatively inexpensive to carry out 
- Retrievability can be low 
- Coverage may be incomplete 
- May not provide insight into personal 
thinking 
- May not apply to general populations 
- Vulnerable to collection bias 
 
Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of document analysis (Sage, n.d.; Yin, 2003) 
 
Waitt (2005) encourages us when trying to filter through the vast amount of 
potential sources of discourse to ask which are going to be the richest. The two 
richest sources of documents embodying RAMSI’s dominant discourses were the 
collection of RAMSI speeches and letters (available at www.RAMSI.org). The 
collection of speeches consisted of 50 documents, the earliest from July 2003 and 
the most recent from November 2013. The letters from RAMSI consist of copies 
of the monthly column RAMSI has published in the Islands Business magazine 
since January 2010. These comprised the primary document sources, along with 
core RAMSI documents, such as the 2009 Partnership Framework and annual 
reports. However, as Rapley (2007) highlights, it is important to gather secondary 
sources of documentation separate from the mainstream account. Secondary data 
sources included independent annual reports on RAMSI activities, newspaper 
articles, and other assessments of RAMSI’s actions. 
 
The other main source of data was semi-structured interviews. These provide a 
vital source of personal experience, contextual information, and views not 
commonly obtained through document analysis (Yin, 2003). Following a semi-
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structured format also reduces the risk of the researcher imposing their own 
frameworks of meaning and understanding by keeping the interview open, 
flexible, and interactive (Mason, 2004). They also provided a source of counter 
discourse and content from that in RAMSI documents. The following table sets 
out the strengths and weaknesses of semi-structured interviews: 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Good at measuring attitudes 
- Can provide information on 
participant’s underlying thinking and 
motivation 
- Can provide targeted information 
- Fluidity allows interviewer to respond 
to interviewee’s knowledge 
- Good source of interpretive data 
- Needs to be supplemented with other 
methods to assist in interpretation 
- Expensive and time-consuming to 
undertake 
- Reactive bias 
- Interviewees may not recall important 
information 
Table 4: Strengths and weaknesses of semi-structured interviews (Dunn, 2005; 
Mason, 2004; Sage, n.d.) 
 
Willis (2006) cautions that we must, when undertaking a select number of 
interviews regarding wider trends, consider if the interviewees provide a good 
representation of the wider population and if they are in a position to comment. 
Data collected from semi-structured interviews is also never complete, offering 
situated views of issues (Roulston, 2010). However, it is precisely these situated 
views that are of interest in semi-structured interviews. Mason (2004) explains 
that contemporary semi-structured interview processes reflect the belief that 
knowledge is situated and contextual. She goes on to state that this means the 
role of the interview is to bring context to the forefront so situated knowledge can 
be created.  
 
Six official interviews were carried out with Solomon Islanders and expatriates 
who engage with and/or have experience with conflict resolution processes in 
Solomon Islands. In addition to these interviews, numerous informal discussions 
occurred with people involved with the law and justice sector, which were of great 
assistance to the research process and contextual understanding. Of particular 
note are the off the record interviews carried out with senior RAMSI staff. 
Fieldwork was undertaken during a six-week visit to Solomon Islands from June 
to mid-July 2013, in which the majority of time spent was in Honiara. Data 
collection could not be pursued outside of Honiara due to time constraints 
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meaning the appropriate provincial research permits could not be obtained.  A 
research permit to collect data in Honiara was obtained from the Solomon Islands 
Government (SIG). Initial interview participants were identified through 
previously established contacts in Solomon Islands, and subsequent participants 
identified through recommendations from other people. Interviewees were given 
a copy of the interview schedule outlining the broad topics to be discussed. 
Aspects that are more specific were delved into through probing questions as 
avenues became apparent.  
 
Data Analysis and Coding 
Coding simplifies the mass of data collected in the research process. It facilitates 
understanding by categorising data and making it more familiar. Categorisation 
also helps create an organisational structure that can be easily searched (Cope, 
2005).  Coding was done using the NVivo (version 10) software package. NVivo is 
designed for coding qualitative data and contains tools to code data and analyse it 
through different text and query searches (QSR International, 2013). NVivo is 
useful in helping to work systematically through data, uncovering emerging 
themes, and the visualisation tools help obtain a new perspective on the research 
(Wiltshier, 2011). In the research, NVivo was predominantly used for coding, 
together with some preliminary data analysis through simple query searches. 
Data was primarily separated into information relating to the three chronological 
categories used in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight: initial intervention, 
statebuilding, and the reorientation of RAMSI. Within these categories, data was 
further divided into whether it related to the three faces of domination, RAMSI’s 
own legitimacy, or issues that undermined the strategies. 
 
Two data analysis techniques were used in the research: content analysis and 
discourse analysis. Content analysis assesses both the quality and quantity of 
statements in a document to ascertain its meaning (Ferrari, 2007). When 
assessing quantity, content in documentation is coded into pre-determined 
categories to assess their significance in constituting the documents meaning 
(Harvey et al., 2004).  When focusing on quality, the researcher seeks to interpret 
meaning without translating findings into numerical coded data (Ferrari, 2007). 
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These two versions set up a continuum with the more qualitative quality analysis 
on one side and quantitative quantity analysis on the other.  The research used a 
qualitative approach to establish the meaning of the texts. However, content 
analysis only establishes meaning: 
 
“in the sense of what is explicit in the words used in the text and what is 
implied by their use from the range of alternatives that could have been 
employed. There is no suggestion that the text has an essential [original 
emphasis] meaning … content analysis is a simple affair of describing the 
actual content of a text.” 
(Brewer, 2003, p. 44) 
 
This is precisely the simple affair needed to describe the more visible ways that 
RAMSI affected legitimacy in the rule of law through the first and second 
dimensions of domination. The processes used first required identifying the main 
themes and coding the data accordingly. These themes were then analysed in 
conjunction with the information in the literature review to allow conclusions to 
be drawn. However, content analysis is insufficient when working with the 
invisible elements of domination such as governmentality and the third 
dimension. For these discourse analysis was utilised.  
 
Discourse analysis is the process of looking at what is and is not said, 
investigating how issues are raised, seeing what forms of knowledge and evidence 
are deployed, unveiling how specific identities are produced and sustained, and 
assessing the regularity and variability of data (Waitt, 2005). In discourse 
analysis language is not treated as neutral, rather it is performative and 
functional (Rapley, 2007). There are many different definitions of discourse itself. 
Alvesson and Karreman (2000) detail these definitions as ranging from extreme 
post-structuralist conceptions, which see language as the fundamental structuring 
principle of society, to extreme linguistic approaches that see discourse as a 
purely linguistic performance. As set out in the literature review, this research 
takes a strong, but not absolute view of discourse. In this form, it is a powerful 
tool for analysing what is taken for granted in everyday issues and actions, along 
with how this affects society (Rose, 2007). This is used in the research to 
investigate the more abstract and hidden effects on legitimacy, those revolving 
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around concepts of governmentality and the third dimension of domination. By 
their very definition, these concepts are invisible, for it is from their subversive 
and taken for granted nature that they derive their influence. Therefore, discourse 
analysis is powerful in that it can make these relationships visible. 
 
The very nature of discourse limits the description of how discourse analysis is 
carried out. Waitt (2005) explains that an approach that is too formulaic and too 
mechanistic undermines the very concept of discourse analysis. Rose (2007) 
describes seven strategies for interpreting discourse: 
 
- Look with fresh eyes, do away with pre-existing categories 
- Immerse yourself in the texts 
- Identify key themes and code them 
- Examine how the key themes effect ‘truth’ 
- Look for complexity and contradictions 
- Look for the invisible and mechanisms of silence 
- Focus on details 
 
Following these strategies allowed for structure and academic rigour in the 
research, but did not undermine the discourse analysis by being too rigid in its 
approach. It allowed an approach that acknowledges the messy nature of the real 
world. However, with such messiness there are bound to be some obscurities that 
need clearing up.  
 
Possible Ambiguities 
In RAMSI documents, there is an ambiguity between technical advisors, capacity 
builders, and staff in in-inline positions. RAMSI uses the term technical advisor 
to refer to staff in in-line positions and/or staff in capacity-building positions. It is 
often difficult to discern whether they mean both roles combined or just one 
separately without reading much more of the document. For this research 
technical advisor and advisor is used to reference specifically staff in capacity 
building roles.  
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Another ambiguity is how the relationship between the modern Western state 
and the rule of law is treated. The discussion chapter of this research often 
mentions an effect on the legitimacy of the state. The assumption is that because 
of the centrality of the rule of law to the state, and the state as largely the 
embodiment of the rule of law, an increase in the legitimacy of the state will also 
increase the legitimacy of the rule of law.  
 
The use of the word domination may also seem heavy handed to some and has 
very strong neo-colonial overtones.  However, for a view that sees the world as a 
field of competing discourses struggling to establish their ‘truth’ (an idea central 
to this research), domination becomes the means by which one discourse 
triumphs over the others. There is nothing inherently bad about it; it is just the 
process in which truth is established. In fact, this research aims to mobilise a type 
of domination through its argument over the reader to establish the truth of its 
ideas. 
 
Another aspect of the research that is somewhat jarring is the degree of 
intentionality assumed. A surface reading might show that the staff within 
RAMSI itself are actively seeking to dominate Solomon Islanders. This is not the 
intended message. Due to the nature of domination described in the above 
paragraph, people may not be aware that they are exerting a type of domination. 
Additionally, systems theory can shed light on this apparent intentionality. 
Emergence is a concept where multitudes of simple interactions within a system 
generate complex and emergent properties that appear to be more than the sum 
of its parts (Galatzer-Levy, 2002). Applied to RAMSI’s apparent intentionality to 
dominate, at the organisational level these tendencies can emerge out of the 
interactions within the organisation, even if the intentions to dominate are not 
present at that level. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Development is fundamentally an undertaking in ethics. Above all else, it is “a 
question of values and human attitudes, self-defined goals, and criteria for 
determining what are tolerable costs to be borne in the course of change” (Goulet, 
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1997, p.111). A consideration of ethical implications is therefore doubly important 
in development research. The main ethical consideration in this work is the 
potential development of a research process that merely extracts information and 
gives nothing back to the communities and people involved. Denzin et al. (2008) 
describe how the research practice has been linked to imperialism and 
colonialism. The researcher who gives nothing back to the community 
perpetuates these rhetorics. Two main approaches were used in the research to 
address this. First, obtaining written informed consent from all interviewees was 
mandatory. Following the advice of Willis (2006), this involved giving 
participants clear information about what is involved in the research, their right 
to decline to participate, and what options they have in participating. Howitt and 
Stevens (2005) explain that informed consent is especially important when 
working in cross-cultural environments. Written consent was obtained from all 
interview subjects and a research summary provided to them. Appendices One 
and Two contain samples of these documents. Ethics approval was also obtained 
from Victoria University prior to leaving to undertake fieldwork, as was the 
required research permit from SIG.  
 
Howitt and Stevens (2005) also stress the importance of agreeing on how to use 
the information and to give participants the opportunity to access the research 
findings.  Establishing this with individual participants in the research (including 
both interviewees and other people who assisted the research) was a priority and 
appropriate methods were established. Rose (2007) reminds us that the language 
in this final report also is a form of discourse: it represents and constrains truth in 
different ways. Care has been taken to ensure the use of language does not 
obscure important aspects of the research. Summaries of the research’s key 
findings have also been prepared for participants who might not have the time to 
read the full report.  
 
Another key ethical consideration involved power relations. As described by 
Brydon (2006) different relationships of power between the stakeholders saturate 
any research context. The researcher then must be context-sensitive. This is 
especially pertinent given the close-knit nature of those involved with law and 
justice in Solomon Islands. To avoid any negative impacts any particular 
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comment or opinion might have on someone it was decided to keep all 
participants anonymous and to refer to them through general position titles. The 
research participants were experienced professionals engaging with law and 
justice issues. As I was junior in this relationship, power was more on the side of 
the research participants.  
Conclusion 
The research used two main sources of data: transcripts from semi-structured 
interviews and documents released by RAMSI. This data was coded using NVivo, 
a software package that helps organise and analyse textual information. When 
analysing the data, content analysis was used to understand the first and second 
dimensional effects RAMSI had on the legitimacy of the rule of law. Critical 
aspects affecting legitimacy are also the invisible third dimension of domination 
and governmentality. Discourse analysis was used to uncover these in the data. 
However, the data analysis was not that simple. Proper consideration of 
epistemology and positionality are vital for a well-designed research process. The 
consideration of these factors, followed by core ethical elements and research 
ambiguities, helped establish the legitimacy of the research by allowing for proper 
reflexivity. Having completed this, we can begin to answer the question of how 
the contemporary peacebuilding agenda develops the legitimacy of the rule of law 
in post-conflict states. 
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Chapter Six: Shock, Awe, and a Mandate 
The following three chapters present the main findings of the research. Each 
chapter represents one key chronological period of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Like the divisions chosen in Chapter Two, 
these divisions are relatively arbitrary and the periods of change between the 
periods was gradual and never complete. This relationship is shown in Figure 3 
below. 
 
Figure 3: The changing focus of RAMSI 
 
 Each chapter unpicks the key elements that defined the period, focusing on the 
different strategies of domination employed to develop legitimacy in the rule of 
law, influences on and shifts in RAMSI’s own legitimacy, and any negative factors 
that arose to the detriment of the overall project. It is by exploring these elements 
that we gain insight into the research questions. 
 
This first chapter of the three looks at the initial deployment of RAMSI that 
occurred on 5 June 2003. With respect to the strategies of domination, this 
period was categorised by the use of coercive military force to restore basic law 
and order and the imposition of the victor’s peace to consolidate gains. Secondly, 
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an analysis of RAMSI’s enabling framework and structure helps explain RAMSI’s 
own legitimacy and the broad-based public support it obtained and largely 
retained. 
 
Restoring Basic Law and Order 
The first stage of post-Tensions peacebuilding began in 5 June 2003 with the 
deployment of RAMSI. It was characterised by a mobilisation of coercive force to 
restore basic law and order and the monopoly on violence, seen as the 
preconditions for the rule of law and the state (Stromseth et al., 2006; Beswick, 
2009; Andrieu, 2010). Then Special Coordinator, Nick Warner, summed up the 
primary goals of the first stage at the time: 
 
“Our immediate purpose is to restore law and order in Solomon Islands. 
Our police will be working hand-in-hand with the Solomon Islands police 
to provide safety and security to streets and villages and to get guns out of 
communities. Only then will conditions exist for the revival of the 
economy.” 
(2003a, p.1) 
 
The impacts of these initial actions to restore law and order and the rule of law 
are relatively straightforward and dealt with first. Also of concern for this first 
stage of RAMSI are the structural aspects of how it operated. The form of RAMSI 
affected to what degree citizens felt pressured to adhere to outside notions of 
government and justice, a process described by Talentino (2007). If citizens do 
feel pressured, it is because strategies of domination have become visible. Swartz 
(2005) tells us that the less visible the types of domination are the more effective 
they are, therefore making them visible reduces their effectiveness. This in turn 
makes the development of legitimacy more difficult. The key elements of RAMSI’s 
form focused on for this discussion are its regional nature, its legislative 
framework, its mandate, and the accountability processes for civilian personal. 
 
This stage most visibly represents a one-dimensional strategy of domination. 
Shock and awe describes the initial tactic used by RAMSI, as they relied on the 
show of overwhelming force to intimidate any militants into surrendering: 
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“we came in with a very large potent military force … We did that quite 
deliberately so that we didn’t have to use military force during this 
operation, and it worked. We got the attention very quickly of the 
militants and the thugs and the criminals, and they made a very correct 
strategic decision – that is, that it was better to co-operate with us than to 
take us on.” 
(Warner in Fullilove, 2006, p.34) 
 
It is undeniable that RAMSI was very successful at this initial stage, with over 
3700 firearms recovered and 340 arrests made by the end of 2003 (PIFS, 2004). 
This strong use of coercive force allowed RAMSI to re-establish basic legitimacy 
in the rule of law. Delivering the ‘service’ of basic security and safety by re-
establishing the monopoly on violence to a legitimate institution achieved this. 
While it was not Solomon Islands Government (SIG) that directly held this 
monopoly, the arrangement tying RAMSI to SIG through the enabling legislation 
(Fullilove, 2006), imparted it indirectly. However, as described in Chapter Three, 
issues did arise out of having two policing systems: the Participating Police Force 
(PPF), perceived as legitimate amongst Solomon Islanders for reasons described 
in Chapter Three; and the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSPIF), 
distrusted due to their earlier involvement in the Tensions.  
 
This coercive strategy reflects the victor’s peace described by Richmond et al. 
(2011) where the imposition of peace is through top-down and coercive means. It 
restores the monopoly on violence, which as shown in Chapter Four, is essential 
for the rule of law and the state itself. It allows rule of law institutions to exercise 
the first dimension of domination to ensure compliance with the law. RAMSI and 
the PPF in this first stage used the victor’s peace (as a first dimensional strategy) 
to establish this monopoly. By doing this, it raised output legitimacy in the rule of 
law by showing what a functioning state and functioning justice sector can 
deliver. In fact, it raised output legitimacy to a degree that process legitimacy in 
Solomon Islands institutions could not keep up. For example, in 2012 it was 
predicted that the Tension Trials would still not be completed by mid-2013 
(Talasasa in Buchanan, 2012). SIG have also expressed concern that the Tension 
Trials have drawn resources away from other cases and limited the ability of the 
country to move on (RAMSI, 2010a). Averre (2008) also discusses this idea. He 
highlights how the adversarial nature of the courts, and the fact that most former 
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militants are forced to deny their charges because of the significant terms of 
imprisonment proposed, prevents societal healing and reconciliation.  Echoes of 
Berg (2012) are apparent, where the justice system cannot keep pace with arrests 
and issues follow. For Solomon Islands, there were issues, and issues despite the 
extensive in-line staff from across the Pacific RAMSI placed within the courts. 
 
RAMSI’s Regional Nature 
The most obvious aspect of RAMSI’s form is its regional nature, this was 
important from the very beginning. In his speech marking 100 days of RAMSI, 
Nick Warner talked about “your friends from around the Pacific” (2003b, p.1). 
Also, as “RAMSI arrived in July 2003 with the endorsement of the Pacific Islands 
Forum” (Ash, 2007, p.2), its regional nature was all the stronger. This was 
fundamental in overcoming a chicken or the egg problem, namely: what comes 
first, a legitimate security sector or the rule of law? The literature review describes 
this problem as where interventions are forced to use ineffective coercive force to 
develop the rule of law, which can then legitimise the security sector. While 
coercive force was central to RAMSI, it minimised tensions by using military and 
police contingents to establish the preconditions for the rule of law that drew 
their legitimacy from other sources, not the rule of law within Solomon Islands, 
which the RSIPF is dependent upon.  This legitimacy came from the established 
rule of law, and other shared characteristics, in the participating countries. 
 
The 2009 SIG committee report into the RAMSI intervention described two 
similarities between the participating countries and Solomon Islands, in terms of 
laws and legal systems, which are significant: 
 
“First, most are island nations with laws tailored for circumstances that 
are quite similar to those of Solomon Islands. Second, all are common law 
jurisdictions (as opposed to civil law) which derive most of their written 
laws from England and also apply principles of common law and equity; 
as is the case in Solomon Islands.” 
(p.78) 
 
This shared history gave RAMSI a form of surrogate legitimacy, which then 
allowed it to establish the preconditions for the rule of law in a way that was 
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legitimate in the eyes of the public.  The contingent of RAMSI staff who are from 
other Pacific islands are particularly important in this respect, as they have even 
more in common with Solomon Islanders than much of the Australian and New 
Zealand contingents.  
 
The regional nature also had an impact on RAMSI’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of 
RAMSI itself is important to avoid the situation described by Talentino (2007). 
Legitimacy by definition means people believe in the truth of the institution’s 
right to operate (i.e. RAMSI). By association, this is imparted, but not totally, 
onto the work it does (strengthening the rule of law). Similarly, distrust and 
dislike of the institution taints its work. Having established this, how did RAMSI’s 
regional nature contribute to its legitimacy? Firstly, a key element of democracy is 
pluralism. Rawls describes how an organisation derives its legitimacy from “an 
appeal to the values and ideas of public reason and these political values are 
supported by an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls in 
Rose, 2008, p.419). Pluralism brings in the multiple ideas and values held by 
different people to include it in the overlapping consensus. RAMSI’s regional 
nature developed such pluralism and brought in multiple doctrines, hence 
increasing legitimacy. However, the regionalism was not total as the majority of 
staff were Australian and there was a perception that “officers from other Pacific 
Islands [in the PPF] were a token gesture” (Averre, 2008, p.17). However, there 
was more to the legitimacy of RAMSI. Under the modern peacebuilding agenda, 
intervention legitimacy is dependent on cooperation with the host country. 
 
Legislative Framework 
The intervention’s legal framework consisted of three primary documents: the 
Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003, the Facilitation of 
International Assistance Notice 2003, and the RAMSI Treaty (SIG, 2009b). 
These established RAMSI not as a transitional administration, but as an 
assistance package that works with and inside SIG: SIG remained in control of 
executive, judicial and legislative authority (Fullilove, 2006). Under this 
legislation, SIG could also review the intervention on an annual basis and revoke 
its right to operate in the country (Dinnen, 2008). This acted as a limit on 
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RAMSI’s power and was a powerful message to Solomon Islanders that it is not 
some neo-colonial exercise, therefore protecting its legitimacy. It shows an 
attempt to get around the issues raised in the literature review by Chandler 
(2006) and Heathershaw (2008) about the redefinition of sovereignty to a 
continuum. Speaking at Henderson Airport upon RAMSI’s arrival in Solomon 
Islands Nick Warner stated: 
 
“Let me emphasize again that Australia, New Zealand, and the other 
Pacific countries involved in the regional assistance mission are here at 
the formal and explicit request of your government. All of us respect the 
fact that Solomon Islands is an independent and sovereign country. We 
are here to help you and your government restore that sovereignty -­‐ to 
restore the capacity of government to represent its people and to act in the 
public good.” 
 (2003a, p.2) 
 
Rather than sharing sovereignty with SIG, RAMSI’s legislative framework 
established RAMSI as supporting it. Yet, RAMSI, especially prior to 2007, had the 
lion’s share of authority (discussed more in Chapter Seven). Under the 
Westphalian conception of the state, sovereignty is dependent on authority 
(Krasner, 1999). Therefore, a degree of sovereignty subversion did occur.  
 
Of importance is RAMSI’s mandate, as this established what work it was to carry 
out. Over time, this became increasingly important as a reference point. The 
mandate was more than just restoring law and order, in a speech Nick Warner 
explained that: 
 
“We did not offer to just come in and simply lock up the criminals and 
clear the streets, collect guns and then go home. We came to work with 
you to ensure all of this could last, could be just the beginning, just the 
foundations for a brand new future for all Solomon Islands.” 
(2004b, P.3) 
 
The mandate was expressed in the SIG Policy Statement on the Offer by the 
Australian Government for Strengthening Assistance to Solomon Islands as: 
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“1) Restore civil order in Honiara and throughout the rest of the country, 
including confiscating illegal weapons, investigating and prosecuting new 
criminal offences, strengthening the courts and prison system and 
protecting key government ministries; 
2) Stabilise government finances, including securing revenue collection 
and controlling expenditure, strengthening financial administrative 
safeguards and obtaining donor and international financial institutions’ 
support; 
3) Promote longer-term economic recovery and revive business 
confidence, including implementing economic reform, dealing with 
corruption and improving debt management; and  
4) Rebuild the machinery of government, including the functioning of the 
National Parliament, the Cabinet, the public service and the electoral 
process.” 
(2003a, n.p.) 
 
Here the mandate reflects standard international fare. It directly relates to three 
of Zaum’s (2007) performance criteria: administrative effectiveness, rule of law 
and the establishment of a free market economy; and indirectly to human rights 
through clause 1 and democratisation through all clauses. It also covers all five 
points set out in the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals: legitimate politics, 
security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services (ID, 2011). 
Solomon Islanders did not contribute to the mandate through normative 
discussions, as quite rightly, there was no time to do so beforehand, but the 
mandate was never subsequently changed. Therefore, the mandate represents the 
intrinsic view of legitimacy described in the literature review, especially the views 
of authors like Paris (2004) that there are certain non-negotiable elements of the 
state, which RAMSI was to construct.  
 
The mandate is important as it established what things could overtly be done to 
build legitimacy in the rule of law. It represented a two dimensional strategy of 
domination, in that it created a hierarchy of the essential tasks to put Solomon 
Islands back on the right track. Principally this meant establishing the rule of law, 
restoring the government to a functional Western model, and creating the 
conditions for a market-based economy. Others, such as normative discussions 
on the form of the state, were taken off the table until the tier one tasks were 
accomplished. Here it is worth considering the implications of path-dependence 
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theory where dynamic processes produce self-reinforcing outcomes (Belloni, 
2012).  The development of these initial ‘essential’ institutions under this theory 
create the conditions for perpetuating those particular state forms, further 
limiting normative discussions. The result of all this for legitimacy in the rule of 
law is the marginalisation and delegitimisation of non-state systems of conflict 
resolution and the legitimisation of the rule of law, through perpetuating the 
assumption that it has an intrinsic claim to legitimacy. However as shown earlier, 
intrinsic legitimacy is a myth. Because of this, claims in RAMSI discourse that 
certain state aspects (the rule of law) are intrinsically legitimate is actually a third 
dimensional strategy to get people to believe that they are intrinsically legitimate.  
This is a strategy that is hard to achieve, as it sets up the rule of law in opposition 
to other conceptions of conflict resolution and societal organisation, creating an 
‘either-or’ situation. This fundamental conflict permeates all subsequent work 
and destabilises all gains made.  
 
Lastly, the willingness of international actors to accept RAMSI existing with and 
inside SIG rather than above them implies the recognition of SIG as a legitimate 
government by international actors. As international legitimacy can affect 
internal legitimacy (OECD, 2010), the recognition of SIG builds legitimacy in the 
rule of law through it being a core aspect of the type of state recognised. The 
report referenced does not explain the mechanisms in which international 
legitimacy affects internal legitimacy. Yet, one can imagine that the explicit or 
implicit endorsement of a state’s processes and outputs by international actors 
gives greater credence to them. This is in the same way that a reference to a 
scholarly resource would give the previous statement more legitimacy in the eyes 
of the reader. This is poignant considering that despite how unpopular the 
Kamekeza government was upon intervention, it would go on to be the first 
government to complete a full term of office (2001 – 2006) since independence 
(Dinnen, 2008). 
 
Accountability of Civilian Personnel 
As discussed in the literature review, central to the contemporary peacebuilding 
agenda are issues where those with true authority are not accountable to the 
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people (Chandler, 2007).  Caplan (2005), with reference to the intervention in 
Bosnia, describes a fundamental contradiction: intervention staff were largely 
accountable only to themselves but their goal was establishing democratic and 
accountable institutions. In effect, this was a case of illiberal means for liberal 
ends. It is important to consider how these, and similar issues, relate to 
peacebuilding initiatives in Solomon Islands as they have a significant impact on 
legitimacy, both of RAMSI and the rule of law. 
 
An area where this was dealt with well by RAMSI, despite the debates that 
emerged, is the legislation controlling how any RAMSI staff who break the law are 
handled. To begin, a first glance does raise some issues.  Section 17(1) of the 
Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 states: 
 
“Members of the visiting contingent, the assisting country, and any other 
country whose personnel are members of the visiting contingent, shall 
have immunity from legal proceedings in Solomon Islands courts and 
tribunals in relation to actions of the visiting contingent or its members 
that are taken in the course of, or are incidental to, official duties.” 
 (SIG, 2003b) 
 
Assisting countries could also claim jurisdiction over criminal and disciplinary 
proceedings for conduct outside official duties, with civil, administrative and 
customary law proceedings being under Solomon Islands jurisdiction (SIG, 
2009). Concerns were raised that this immunity deprived citizens of their 
constitutional right to recourse, allowed RAMSI personnel to operate outside the 
law, and interfered with the independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Office and the Minister for Justice (SIG, 2009b). In a submission to the 2009 
inquiry into the RAMSI intervention, former Prime Minister and then leader of 
the opposition, Manasseh Sogavare, stated: 
 
“If the VC [visiting contingent] is here to restore law and order then they 
must comply with our laws. It does not make any logical sense for them to 
break our laws in order to make us comply with our laws.” 
(p.34) 
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Here there are parallels with the illiberal means for liberal ends argument. These 
issues were central to the 2006 case of Nori v. Attorney General. Mr Nori sought 
a declaration that the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 (FIA) was 
unconstitutional. The central elements of his argument were that section 17 made 
the FIA unconstitutional, as did the Act’s unfettered nature and how it deprived 
citizens of their right of recourse in the courts. However, Chief Justice Palmer 
rejected both these arguments. He stated that it is not unfettered because actions 
outside official duties are not covered. In addition, section 24 of the FIA subjects 
the act to the Constitution, so it is under the court’s jurisdiction to determine the 
scope of immunity.  
 
The 2009 SIG inquiry into RAMSI also found that: 
 
“With regard to the view that the immunity is inappropriate and allows 
RAMSI personnel to operate outside the law, the Committee is satisfied on 
the balance of evidence presented during the inquiry that this is simply 
not true.”  
(p.78) 
 
Secondly, because of the alignment between legal systems of the participating 
countries and Solomon Islands, along with immunity not being certain (due to 
participating countries having the option to decline jurisdiction), the 2009 
Committee believed:  
 
“the immunity from legal proceedings provided by section 17 of the FIA 
Act is not inconsistent with other local laws, does not inherently breed 
carelessness or abuse, and remains as appropriate as it was in 2003.”  
(p.78) 
 
These two findings show that the FIA was successful in imparting a measure of 
accountability onto RAMSI staff. It escaped the issue that could befall an 
intervention where local laws do not hold intervention staff to account. For the 
institutional legitimacy of the intervention, bypassing local legal systems 
perpetuates an image of the intervention being an outsider. It promotes an ‘us 
and them’ dichotomy that moves the balance towards the Talentino (2007) 
scenario. Such a situation delegitimises local courts by reducing their 
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international legitimacy.  It effectively states that local courts are not suitable to 
fairly try intervention staff, which also negatively influences process legitimacy. 
Through the lens of the three dimensions of domination, such a rejection of local 
institutions detracts from any mobilisation of third dimensional domination; if 
the intervention is reluctant to use these institutions it damages any claim that 
they are legitimate. Therefore, the FIA is important because it reduces these 
negative impacts by giving greater recognition to the capabilities of the Solomon 
Islands judicial system. 
 
Conclusion 
The most obvious effect of the first stage of peacebuilding in Solomon Islands was 
the first dimensional mobilisation of coercive force and the victor’s peace to 
restore basic security aspects of the rule of law.  Doing so established the security 
aspect of the rule of law and developed performance legitimacy. It showed what 
the rule of law and the security sector could deliver to the public when it works 
properly. This raised expectations of local institutions, especially in the RSIPF, 
expectations that could not be met. This led to a decline in process legitimacy, as 
local institutions central to the rule of law could not deliver the results people 
wanted and could not adhere to the rigid and equal process that is central to the 
rule of law. Despite the ambiguities of who the monopoly on violence was 
restored to, what matters is that it was to an institution that had internalised the 
rule of law enough to allow the enforcement of its tenets. 
 
The regional nature of RAMSI, its wider structure, and its enabling legislation 
were all important in establishing, and subsequently protecting, the legitimacy of 
the intervening institution. It brought a pluralism of views and ideas to RAMSI 
that increased its legitimacy and palatability to Solomon Islanders. RAMSI’s 
regional nature also allowed it to draw on the familiar rule of law systems in the 
other countries of the Pacific to develop a form of surrogate legitimacy, 
overcoming the chicken and egg problem without illegitimate coercive force. 
Additionally, the resting of ultimate authority with SIG gave international 
legitimacy to the state and the rule of law by association. It offset any claims that 
RAMSI was a neo-colonial exercise. Further offsetting any of these claims, was 
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the compromise established for how RAMSI staff were to be held accountable, 
detracting as it did from any ‘us and them’ dichotomy. It was also an endorsement 
of the local courts and the rule of law.    
 
Finally, RAMSI’s mandate was not decided through normative discussions; it 
established peacebuilding as it is externally not internally defined. In this, it 
created a hierarchy of tasks and thus took some items off the immediate table.  
Looking at the rule of law, the mandate assumed it had an intrinsic right to 
legitimacy and some set form. A matter that is simply false. Because of this, 
normative discussions about the form of the rule of law did not occur. This 
undermined all current and subsequent gains, especially those pursued in the 
subsequent stage around capacity building. 
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Chapter Seven: The Rise of the Advisor 
This stage looks at the institutional component of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) termed statebuilding, which became its 
focus after the initial restoration of law and order. Statebuilding initiatives divide 
into two main types: those based on RAMSI staff working in in-line positions, and 
those where RAMSI staff worked in capacity building/advisor positions. Of the 
two, capacity building was the more important and appropriate weight is given to 
its investigation. 
 
The Shift 
After the initial process of restoring basic law and order and the monopoly on 
violence, RAMSI shifted its focus towards the long term project of what it initially 
called state and nation building (Hameiri, 2007), but would become just 
statebuilding: nationbuilding being too broad and political. The main method for 
this was the mobilisation of intervention personnel to undertake the work. 
Speaking in March 2004, Nick Warner discussed these personnel: 
 
“The nation-building component of RAMSI now consists of about 80 
civilian personnel, many of them drawn from ten Australian Government 
Departments and agencies. Their role is to repair the damage done to 
essential machinery of government over recent years. Advisers have been 
placed throughout the justice system to strengthen the country’s ability to 
deal with the large number of arrests going through the court and prison 
systems. There are also advisers in the Ministry of Finance, helping 
Government regain control of expenditure and improve tax collection. 
Initially many of these advisers have stepped into in-line positions to get 
the bureaucracy functioning again. But over time they will be training up 
their counterparts to take on these functions to ensure the change in 
practices is sustained and sustainable. “ 
 (2004a, p.5) 
 
Two categories of positions define the roles of these personnel: in-line positions 
focusing on service delivery and restoring ‘essential’ state functions, and capacity 
building focused positions. The general strategy was that RAMSI staff would work 
in in-line positions until a local counterpart was trained to do the job, and then 
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they would step back to a capacity building role (Braithwaite et al., 2010). Of the 
work done, that regarding capacity building is the most significant, as it would go 
on to become the central focus of RAMSI, but in-line roles were still vital and will 
be discussed first. 
 
The Tension Trials and In-line Positions 
There was no shortage of tasks for the initial in-line staff and Warner (2004a) 
describes what some of the most critical ones were:  
 
“Public sector reform is required to get the Government delivering 
services. Cabinet and parliamentary processes require review and 
updating. We need to make sure that the watchdog bodies are 
strengthened, to prevent the re-­‐emergence of corruption. We’ll be looking 
to restructure and bolster institutions such as the Leadership Code 
Commission, Ombudsman and Auditor General ... We need to consolidate 
the early assistance to the justice system. RAMSI has already brought in 
magistrates, public solicitors and public prosecutors to ensure that the 
justice system can cope with the large number of arrests and trials.” 
(p.6) 
 
Of particular interest to this research are the in-line positions within the courts 
used to process the large amount of new criminal cases brought by the 
Participating Police Force (PPF), dubbed the Tension Trials. The processing of 
these trials was always a priority for RAMSI in order to alleviate the stress the 
volume of cases placed on the weakened justice system (RAMSI, 2010a). 
Vacancies in the justice system were an important issue to overcome: 
 
“The tension trials are progressing despite high levels of vacancies in the 
office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and with the support of up to 
10 RAMSI funded prosecutors over the course of 2006.” 
(RAMSI, 2007, p.5) 
 
The same report also stated, “The end of the Tension Trials is in sight.” (p.5). 
However, progress slowed when the Enhanced High Court Assistance Package 
ended after 2007 (RAMSI, 2010b). By 2012, 45 Tensions related trials saw 
completion (AusAID, 2012). Unfortunately, speaking in May 2012 the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Ronald Bei Telasasa, said the Tension Trials might not be 
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completed by mid-2013 as expected, with there being nine active cases and two 
outstanding warrants remaining (Talasasa in Buchanan, 2012). Due to the staff 
shortages and the powerful position RAMSI was in, especially in its early years 
(Averre, 2008), it was able to strive ahead with what it wanted. This shows a first 
dimensional strategy because RAMSI had control over resources and was able to 
direct how things went because of this.  This allowed the raising of process and 
output legitimacy in the rule of law, as the courts were functioning again and 
delivering justice. However, the fragility of first dimensional approaches showed 
when funding cuts to the justice sector caused the rate of clearance of Tension 
Trials to fall. Importantly, there were also issues with in-line staff that affected 
legitimacy.  
 
The first and most obvious of these issues was in-line staff being inexperienced 
with the operations of kastom and mechanisms specific to Solomon Islands. 
Speaking of this issue one interviewee told the following story: 
 
“So, someone [a RAMSI in-line staff member] who was obviously working 
at the AG’s chamber at the time had provided legal advice to … I believe it 
was the Minister of Provincial Government at the time ... And basically 
saying that, you know, ‘there is no provision in the law that allows 
compensation to be paid’ … the way you [the Western, modern, legal you] 
hold people accountable is through prosecution and … imposition of 
penalties, you know, i.e. jail time, but that is not correct. I mean in 
Solomons … you need to understand the local context in which 
compensation is incredibly important”  
(Legal Expert 1) 
 
Any such exclusion of important local systems is likely to harm engagement with 
institutions as it makes them more alien. The arguments of authors like Boege et 
al. (2009) and Belloni (2012) around developing hybrid institutions shows that 
working with local systems is important for better legitimation of the state. 
Hybridity is an important way to introduce the rule of law and promote 
engagement, because it creates an area of familiarity. Averre (2008) asks if people 
have accepted the results of the Tension Trials. He explains that concepts integral 
to the Western conception of the rule of law, such as reasonable doubt, are 
misunderstood amongst the general population. From anecdotal observations, he 
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additionally concludes that the people have not totally accepted the results of the 
trials and there is a perception that many people deserving of incarceration have 
gone free. This comes down to a lack of legitimacy in the underlying concepts of 
the judicial system and a lack of legitimacy in the processes that it uses. There are 
two causes for this: a lack of knowledge about how the system works, which 
prevents engagement with formal institutions (Bendaña and Chopra, 2013); and 
an innate conflict between the adversarial nature of the state justice system and 
non-state processes of truth and reconciliation. Not addressing these issues in the 
work of in-line staff through discussions around hybridity undermines other work 
in legitimising the rule of law, as the concept becomes too distant from local 
realties. 
 
Defining Capacity Building 
As explained earlier, building legitimacy in the rule of law requires a holistic 
approach (Stromseth et al., 2006). To achieve this RAMSI’s capacity building, 
which began in earnest in 2005 (George, 2008), used a dual model that was 
officially divided into individual capacity and institutional capacity.  A ‘stocktake’ 
of RAMSI’s efforts established a definition of capacity building as: 
 
“The process by which people, organisations and society as a whole 
develop competencies and capabilities that will lead to sustained and self-
generating performance improvement.” 
 
Additionally: 
 
“This definition is significant because it means that capacity building is 
more than providing training to individuals – although that’s important. 
It’s also about strengthening teams and whole institutions.” 
 
Finally: 
 
“RAMSI’s work springs from a view that, whatever the size of a country, 
there is an irreducible minimum of functions that a state should provide, 
and some irreducible minimum standards that government should 
observe.” 
(Batley, 2005, p.2) 
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The 2005/2006 RAMSI Annual Performance Report set out what successful 
capacity building looks like. The Solomon Islands Government (SIG), its 
institutions, and its personnel should be able to “make better policy choices; 
develop, implement and sustain relevant and effective programs; identify and 
solve problems; perform functions; and achieve objectives” (2006, p.21). If one 
was to create a hierarchy of capacity building, the previous statement would 
constitute the highest aspect, being developing the capacity of the state; under 
this is institutional capacity building; and under this individual capacity building. 
This reveals a three-tier model of capacity building. 
 
Individual Capacity Building 
The trainee-trainer, or advisor-counterpart relationship, was at the core of 
individual capacity building. The fundamental element was the transfer of skills 
from RAMSI staff (mainly Australians) to the Solomon Islands civil service. The 
process of individual capacity building is set out in the following diagram: 
 
 
Figure 4: Individual capacity building (RAMSI, 2007) 
 
It is important to note that the same annual review also stated that no 
programmes used all nine processes in the diagram, but all use some of them. 
Generally, individual capacity building focused on the development of explicit 
knowledge amongst the civil service through the advisor-counterpart 
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relationship. One interviewee provides a useful of example of what this looks like 
in practice with reference to the justice sector:  
 
“Part of it is training, there is a whole lot of models of training that might 
not just be courses, but things like going and sitting and working in the 
legal aid office in Queensland for two months; or you are actually doing 
cases with other experienced lawyers; or there might be, you know, 
actually helping you to do some further study that you couldn't afford to 
do yourself; or it might be all these sort of things. But, I actually think for 
the law and justice sector, particularity with the advocates, a lot of it is 
actually working alongside senior people who can provide an example.” 
(Legal Expert 2) 
 
This means the training of the civil service in the Western practices that the 
trainers are experienced in. Importantly, looking at the diagram above there were 
opportunities for trainee feedback, but the prevalence of these practices is 
uncertain. This approach was mainly second dimensional, as the skill base of the 
trainer, combined with a system where RAMSI established the goals of capacity 
building, set the shape that the individual capacity building must take.  A shape 
focused on skills tailored for operating within a rules-based environment and 
promoting the rule of law, as externally defined, as a core state service. 
 
Organisational Capacity Building 
A description of what organisational capacity building involved is much harder to 
find in RAMSI documents. Discussions of it in the 2006/2007 Annual 
Performance Report are limited to it constituting ministries having greater say on 
the direction of capacity building, as opposed to the individual advisors and 
RAMSI. However, an interviewee described it as follows: 
 
“The idea is that the organisation is able to perform the functions that it 
was charged with doing and that can involve [overcoming] structural 
challenges, systematic challenges, funding challenges, all of those things. 
So, sometimes the capacity building support has been to go in and work 
out ways which would often involve, I guess, an advisor coming in who 
might be able to help work with local staff about what kind of structure 
would work better; what laws need to be changed … So, you can have a 
policy for a certain ministry that works one way, but the staff are all sort of 
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tasked with jobs that come from the policy ten years ago, so they are not 
going to respond … if someone comes in and helps them think a little 
about that; it’s all a bit [like] strategic planning like that.  Sometimes it’s 
also just about, I think, what the roles of each ministry are.” 
(Legal Expert 2) 
 
From this view, organisational capacity building was about restoring the basic 
operational and organisational form of institutions through means such as 
legislative reform, structural changes, defining reporting systems, strategic 
planning, and defining staff roles. This shows crossover with individual capacity 
building as this would also invariably involve things like defining roles and 
working with reporting systems, not to mention that for any institutions to be 
able to function its staff must be suitably trained. Despite all this, there is more to 
organisational capacity building: the machinery of government pillar itself. 
 
How does it relate to organisational capacity building? The 2007/2008 RAMSI 
Annual Report set out long-term outcomes of the machinery of government pillar 
as: 
 
- Government services responsive to and reaching all people effectively 
- Efficient and predictable public administration 
- Increased accountability of government and institutions 
- Executive and legislative arms of government functioning effectively 
(RAMSI, 2008) 
 
The achievement of these outcomes necessitates the development of 
organisational capacity across Solomon Islands institutions.  Additionally, 
fulfilment of the long-term outcomes above are necessary to meet the vision of 
successful capacity building set out in the 2005/2006 Annual Report. However, 
the relationship between organisational capacity building and the rule of law 
requires further investigation. 
 
The cementation of the rule of law within the state itself is fundamental to any 
wider legitimation of the concept, an argument put forward in Chapter Four. It 
highlights the importance of establishing the rules of the game, or as RAMSI 
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terms it creating ‘a rules-based environment’ (2007, p.38).  Organisational 
capacity building is then the establishment of the rule of law within the state 
itself. It is hard to imagine how the rule of law can be legitimate for the public, 
and its rules internalised, if the state itself does not obey its own tenets. RAMSI 
was involved in both establishing these rules and developing the systems to 
enforce them. 
 
The development of the Public Service Code of Conduct (The Code) was used by 
RAMSI as an example of one of its achievements in strengthening the Solomon 
Islands public service, where it “provides a minimum standard of conduct and 
work performance for public officers” (RAMSI, n.d.c, n.p.).  This Code emerged 
after the first Human Resource Management survey of SIG found that only 36 
percent of public servants found the General Orders easy to interpret. The Code 
aimed to provide greater clarity on roles and responsibilities (RAMSI, 2010a). 
Training was given on The Code throughout the civil service and disciplinary 
action for breaches of it saw demotions and censures, which is said to have raised 
awareness about The Code and the importance of ethical conduct (RAMSI, 
2011b). Despite The Code, issues around establishing a rules-based environment 
remain. Speaking about absenteeism in the courts one interviewee explains that: 
 
“It has become the system itself, and I used to joke ‘I think our economy is 
going down because of habitual absenteeism and persistent lateness.’” 
(Legal Expert 3) 
 
A 2012 review by AusAID on law and justice assistance in Solomon Islands also 
states that absenteeism is a significant problem in the Royal Solomon Islands 
Police Force as well. Absenteeism is a good proxy indicator for the internalisation 
of state processes by civil servants, as turning up for work is one of the 
fundamental rules of any contract.  Nonetheless, codes of conduct are an 
important aspect of creating a rules-based environment, as shown by Gilman 
(2005). The Code of Conduct and the training of people in its application 
represents a third dimension strategy of domination, as it aimed to establish its 
principles as the true way a civil servant should conduct themselves. The 
disciplinary measures used to enforce it are a simple first dimensional strategy to 
coerce people into adhering to its principles. Related to the enforcement of the 
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rules of the game is an important second dimensional strategy and one that was 
central to RAMSI: accountability.  
 
Accountability was one of RAMSI’s core areas and is used to “combat weak 
administration and improper behaviour” (RAMSI, n.d.d, n.p.). The medium term 
targets regarding it, before the signing of the 2009 Partnership Agreement, were 
as follows: 
 
- Reports and financial statements on time 
- Case backlogs eliminated from accountability institutions 
- Citizen complaints facilitated 
- Government responding to findings 
- Parliamentary review of findings increased 
- Electoral systems strengthened 
- Women more likely to be elected 
- Engagement with MPs increased 
- Demand for better governance strengthened 
(RAMSI, 2007) 
 
Of the accountability institutions, RAMSI frequently used the Office of the 
Auditor-General as a success story. Speaking in 2007 RAMSI Special Coordinator 
Tim George said the following:  
 
“at Independence in 1978 the Auditor General’s Office had 29 staff. By the 
time RAMSI arrived in 2003 there were just two! Indeed the office had 
effectively ceased to function by 2000; no audits had been tabled in 
parliament since 1987. Now, I am happy to say due to the combined 
efforts of the Government and RAMSI, the Office of the Auditor General 
has 28 staff and has already had 10 special audits tabled in parliament in 
the last year. Just as significantly the office now also has a five year 
strategic plan which maps the way forward not only for audits but for 
capacity building within the institution.” 
(p.3) 
 
Initially technical assistance from RAMSI was direct, with a focus on clearing the 
backlog of audits. Over time this transitioned to an indirect model, where RAMSI 
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staff focused on supporting Solomon Island team members to work out problems 
and think through multiple solutions (World Bank, 2008).  
 
In terms of strategies of domination, two are central to accountability. First, there 
is the relatively straightforward first dimensional coercive strategy.  The threat of 
making improper actions public, with the repercussions that entails, is a direct 
control on decision-making. However taking this deeper, accountability 
mechanisms can be seen as an anti-two-dimensional strategy. Second-
dimensional domination is about setting the agenda and controlling who is at the 
decision-making table. Accountability aims to bring the public into the discussion 
(or at least make them aware of it), thus attempting to utilise second dimensional 
domination visible, reducing its effect. In this way, the ability of elites to further 
agendas contrary to the values and beliefs of wider society is limited. Yet, if this is 
to be beneficial to the rule of law, it relies on it existing as a shared belief in wider 
society. 
 
Capacity Building and the State  
At the highest level, capacity building is about the form of the state. This is seen in 
the definition where it “will lead to sustained and self-generating performance 
improvement” (Batley, 2005, p.2).  In other words, the goal of capacity building is 
to establish a form of path-dependence. The literature review describes path-
dependence as where initial dynamic processes generate self-reinforcing 
outcomes, in which a change in direction becomes increasingly difficult due to 
barriers becoming ingrained in political institutions (Belloni, 2012). Therefore, 
capacity building is about creating a state that perpetuates itself. At the bare 
minimum, this requires insulation of certain ‘core’ state functions and processes 
from forces that do not fit into the Western modern state model. Through 
methods such as establishing the rules of the game, and enforcing these rules 
through accountability mechanisms and coercive punishments, the ability of the 
individual (and the societal conventions they embody) to colonise the state is 
restricted. 
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At the institutional level, whether it is training the civil service in state operations 
and service delivery or establishing a rules-based environment through the 
machinery of the state, RAMSI was concerned with shaping institutions.  This 
shaping established the ways that people can feed back to change those 
institutions. As described by Foucault, modern state institutions are characterised 
by a two-way relationship in which the individual is colonised by institutional 
rules, but also their integration into institutions creates a reverse flow from the 
individual to the institution. 
 
Looking at the statements that the modern Westphalian state is a product of 
centuries of incremental development based on the unique characteristics of the 
area it developed in (Clements et al., 2007; OECD, 2010), this two-way flow can 
be seen as one of the mechanisms in which society and the state negotiate on its 
institutional forms. This negotiation is important in legitimising the state, and 
developing shared-beliefs about what state-society relationships should look like. 
 
Importantly, RAMSI does invite people to participate in a reverse relationship 
through the partnership rhetoric. For example in a 2004 speech to the Beyond 
Intervention Conference Nick Warner stated: 
 
“And I want to take this opportunity to encourage Solomon Islanders to 
engage in an open and public dialogue with us about the Regional 
Assistance Mission and its work, for without such a dialogue there can be 
no partnership.” 
 (2004b, p.2) 
 
However, the arguments about RAMSI acting as a parallel system and not 
aligning to SIG policy objectives and priorities (SIG, 2009), calls of neo-
trusteeship and shared sovereignty (Kabutaulaka, 2008), and the reluctance to 
engage with local culture (Morgan and McLeod, 2006), indicate that partnership 
was not a strong element of this stage of peacebuilding in Solomon Islands. The 
process of establishing key definitions was an important manifestation of this lack 
of partnership. 
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The capacity building programme relied on externally-derived terms of what a 
state looks like (the same idea that Richmond et al. (2011) describes regarding 
Bosnia). The definition of capacity building given earlier, where it is assumed that 
a state has some irreducible minimum standards and functions, shows this. It is 
also reflected in claims that RAMSI was too focused on the Western modern state 
(Morgan and McLeod, 2006) and not adequately engaging with non-state 
institutions (Fry and Kabutaulaka, 2008; Hameiri, 2012). The broad form of 
these standards and functions are based around the sovereignty performance 
criteria set out by Zaum (2009) of: 
 
- Administrative effectiveness 
- Human rights 
- Democratisation 
- Rule of law 
- Establishment of a free market economy 
 
The use of these external terms skews the equilibrium described by Foucault 
towards colonisation of the individual by the institutions because of the removal 
of opportunities for the individual to shape the institution through definitions. 
Therefore, the establishment of these terms is a second dimensional strategy 
because local actors are not involved in the discussion and they are removed from 
the decision-making table. Upon their establishment, the uptake of these terms 
necessitates a mobilisation of the third dimension of domination so that the terms 
are internalised and a shift from terms to definitions occurs. Overall with RAMSI, 
the individual-institution equilibrium became unbalanced and moved further 
towards the colonisation of the individual. While this allows the easier and more 
timely transplantation of a foreign version of the rule of law, it further limits 
attempts to develop hybridity that could contribute to a more appropriate and 
palatable version of it.  
 
Capacity Building and Legitimacy 
Having established how capacity building operated in this stage, its effects on the 
legitimacy of the rule of law are relatively straightforward. Fundamentally, and by 
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its very definition, it was about raising process legitimacy. This meant 
establishing the rules themselves that the rule of law is based on so that the state 
can operate in a cohesive manner. It also meant establishing the means of 
enforcement for those rules. The black box assumption within capacity building 
was that this increase in process legitimacy also leads to improved performance 
legitimacy, but as shown in the 2012 AusAID evaluation of law and justice 
assistance in Solomon Islands, this may not be the case.   
 
An important aspect of capacity building was the development of shared belief 
legitimacy in the rule of law within the public service.  This is important, as it is 
difficult to see how the public would internalise the principles of the rule of law, if 
those enforcing them do not. At the extreme end of this is corruption, which 
significantly damages legitimacy of institutions (OECD, 2011). Wippman (2010) 
tells us that building the rule of law requires creating a public commitment to 
what makes it up, requiring challenging potentially internalised norms (Brooks, 
2003). In this, the everyday things matter. Building commitment to adhere to the 
small things is important in internalising the rule of law. People most often take 
these for granted and they are central in building shared belief legitimacy. 
Establishing a rules-based environment within the state develops a core nucleus 
of the population who have a shared belief in the rule of law. Fukuyama (2008) 
talks about the importance of having a core national elite loyal to the concept of 
the nation for developing national identity. Establishing the rule of law amongst 
civil servants can be seen as establishing this elite with regard to a belief in the 
legitimacy of the rule of law. The expectation being that they then spread their 
belief amongst the wider public.  
 
The heavy focus RAMSI placed on capacity building of the state and external 
definitions had risks that could harm legitimacy in the rule of law. The literature 
review has already covered the core issues of this. For example, Bendaña and 
Chopra’s (2013) discussion around the focus on the state ignoring important 
cultural issues regarding the rule of law. There is also the argument raised earlier 
that by ignoring non-state systems and things that do not fit into the traditional 
Western modern state mould, there is the potential that the rule of law is seen as 
too different and not relevant to people’s everyday lives. One needs only read the 
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example given in the literature review regarding Timor-Leste to understand the 
potential impacts of this: potential re-emergence of conflict leading to a 
decline/collapse of the state; or less dramatically, institutions just cannot deliver 
what locals demand of them, because they lack the appropriate systems and 
drivers. This would lead to declines in process, output and shared belief 
legitimacy. Finally, Crawford (1993) warns that interventions that rely on external 
definitions risk becoming paternalistic, racist, and exploitative. The emergence of 
any of these would severely damage shared belief legitimacy, as people do not 
believe the institutions work for their benefit and ultimately that is what matters 
most. 
 
Conclusion 
In this period of RAMSI, the focus was on peacebuilding through in-line positions 
and capacity building roles. Both focused on institutions and RAMSI 
implemented the institutional peace. In these early years, RAMSI was in a strong 
position and held a considerable degree of power. Inline positions focused on 
restoring the ‘essential’ elements of the state and rule of law apparatus like the 
courts.  While initially successful, the vulnerability of this approach to changes in 
funding became apparent when funding to the courts shifted and the rate of 
Tension Trial clearances fell. In-line staff also had limited experience with the 
local system, which increased the distance between state institutions and the 
people.  These issues undermined the gains in legitimacy made by the initial 
success of in-line staff. 
 
Capacity building focused on re-establishing the rule of law within the state. A 
three-tier strategy for this is apparent. At the whole of government level, the 
object is to develop the proper institutions so the state form becomes self-
perpetuating and  the institutionalisation of the rule of law was a key element in 
establishing this. At the institutional/organisational level, capacity building 
worked to develop a ‘rules-based environment’ so that individuals interacted with 
the organisation in ways aligned to the goal of creating a self-perpetuating state. 
Methods for this included the creation of a code of conduct and the development 
of accountability mechanisms. This created the ‘right’ civil servant.  Finally, 
 
 
89 
 
individual capacity building focused on giving civil servants the ‘right’ skills and 
knowledge to draw upon in their work. The primary mechanism for this was the 
hierarchical trainee-trainer relationship.  It was with capacity building that the 
greatest weakness of RAMSI became apparent: the lack of normative discussions 
on key definitions that has delegitimised the rule of law, situating it too far away 
from the local. RAMSI’s work in this stage was also highly visible. This led to 
mounting pressure that it was acting above its legislated position. This eventually 
necessitated a move from the institutional peace. 
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Chapter Eight: The Retreat from View 
This final period, from 2007, was one of considerable change for the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). As a response to growing 
academic criticism, pressure from politicians, and the 2006 riots (see Chapter 
Three for more details) it undertook a shift towards the constitutional peace. The 
trends dominating this stage were less visible, relying more on the third 
dimension of domination and dealing with shared belief legitimacy. 
 
The Shift 
Along with the increased use of non-capacity building-based strategies, this stage 
saw two important shifts that affected RAMSI’s own legitimacy. The first was a 
realigning of RAMSI with Solomon Islands Government (SIG) priorities, 
embodied by the 2009 Partnership Framework. Former Special Coordinator, 
Nicholas Coppel, shows this shift in the following statement: 
 
“the focus of RAMSI’s activities has been developed over the years and, 
particularly since 2007, in extensive consultation with Solomon Islands 
Government Officials and ministers and other stakeholders.” 
[Emphasis added] (2012, p.2) 
 
In this respect, it is evident that a shift to the constitutional peace occurred, 
where bottom-up approaches begin to emerge in conjunction with top-down ones 
and working with the local elite is more important (Richmond et al. 2011). It is 
important to note that the rhetoric of this partnership was always present in 
RAMSI, but as explained by Braithwaite et al. (2010) often the reality did not live 
up to the rhetoric for staff who found “capacity building [of people] frustrating 
and found it easier to ‘do it yourself’ and ‘get on with the job’” (p. 57). The other 
significant trend was the stepping back of RAMSI from the spotlight. By reigning 
in its public relations and changing the focus of the Participating Police Force 
(PPF) from frontline policing to capacity building, RAMSI retreated from the 
public eye to undertake the technocratic work of statebuilding in a more apolitical 
environment. Combined with this was the use of two perhaps counteracting 
rhetorics: that Solomon Islanders are striving forward with vigour to rebuild the 
state, and that Solomon Islanders need to step up into the gap that RAMSI has 
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created to stop their country falling back into unrest. Importantly, this stage saw 
the continued use of the strategies described previously regarding capacity 
building, but the public image of these strategies changed.  
 
Stepping Back 
Timing wise, this shift is seen in the light of the 2006 riots, growing concern 
about RAMSI acting as a shadow government, and tensions between RAMSI and 
the Sogavare Government. These issues were harming RAMSI’s legitimacy and 
threatening the work it was doing, necessitating a change in policy and practice. 
One interviewee, with respect to RAMSI’s public relations, described the move 
away from the spotlight: 
 
“The RAMSI PR [public relations] was in overdrive [when RAMSI first 
arrived], everything they did was fantastic. You know, they were out in the 
community holding community events, there were national events, there 
were bands and concerts funded by RAMSI; all manner of things, t-shirts 
everywhere, caps everywhere, you couldn’t walk 5 metres down the road 
without running into someone who had some sort of RAMSI 
paraphernalia. Then it finally dawned on them that this is not helpful. 
This is really unhelpful because it creates a perception about a completely 
parallel police force, and parallel civilian component that was superior to 
the SIG systems and to the [Royal Solomon Islands Police Force].” 
(Legal Expert 4) 
 
This exemplifies an important strategy of RAMSI’s: the depoliticisation/techno-
cratisation of the intervention. This process had been occurring across the 
lifetime of RAMSI. In the beginning, when the focus was on basic law and order, 
RAMSI speeches made particular reference to the intervention as one of nation 
building (Warner, 2003b; Warner, 2004a; Warner, 2004b; Warner, 2004c). 
However, after the first anniversary of RAMSI the politically laden term of nation 
building disappeared in RAMSI speeches, to be replaced by the much more value 
neutral and technocratic ‘statebuilding’. The shift from stage one described in 
Chapter Six to the statebuilding in Chapter Seven, was a technocratisation in itself 
with its focus on the role of technical advisors. The further mobilisation of the 
depoliticisation/technocratisation process strategy was particularly useful as a 
reaction against the growing discontent directed at RAMSI.  
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As explained earlier, this process hides the political nature of an intervention and 
marginalises the contributions of the general citizen (Heathershaw, 2008; 
McKinlay et al., 2013). Akin to the process described in the literature review 
where Europeanisation in Bosnia through its technocratisation portrays itself as a 
civilizing action and the only real option, RAMSI’s work became a matter of 
technical fact where the application of the right tools would transform the country 
from bad to good. 
 
Initially the intervention was highly political. This is a by-product of the initial 
political, not humanitarian justification for the intervention: that the Solomon 
Islands might become a failed state and become a significant risk to the region 
(Howard, 2003). The political narrative behind the intervention, although it did 
draw on the rhetoric of Australia as a regional power looking after its 
neighbourhood, made RAMSI vulnerable to delegitimising influences like claims 
of neo-colonialism, as Australian self-interest was more evident. As described in 
Chapter Six, the regional nature of RAMSI was also important in offsetting this 
somewhat, as it disguised Australian hegemony (disguised, as Australia was still 
the main player). The downscaling of RAMSI public relations was important here 
simply because it made RAMSI and the work it was doing (like building 
legitimacy in the rule of law) less visible, less likely to be discussed, and less likely 
to be viewed as up for debate. It disappeared behind the veil to become part of the 
machinery of government. For the rule of law, the technocratisation of its 
development hides its nature as a cultural construction.  
 
Additionally, this technocratisation portrays the work done as a purely rational 
ordeal, one, where through the correct process and the application of the right 
tools, problems can be broken down and appropriate solutions found. It makes 
peacebuilding and development a science. Doing so draws upon the twin ideas of 
the neutrality of rationalistic investigation and of a mechanistic conception of the 
world that exemplify the intrinsic legitimacy of scientific process. Considering 
this reveals the technocratisation of RAMSI as a particular strategy; which 
develops a shared belief in the intrinsic legitimacy of the rule of law by portraying 
its development as a neutral and rationalistic endeavour. 
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The downshift in RAMSI’s public relations also applied to the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force (RSIPF) and combated the pressure that constantly 
exemplifying the success of the PPF put on the RSIPF to deliver a standard of 
justice outside its capacity. Related to this is the transition of PPF officers away 
from front line roles to focus “on increasing the RSIPF’s institutional and 
personal capacity” (RAMSI, 2012a, p.1). Nicholas Coppel explained this process: 
 
“The PPF in consultation with the RSIPF, have, in recent months, 
conducted a comprehensive review of all 13 provincial police posts that are 
supported by RAMSI officers. The conclusion of the review is that the time 
is now right for the RSIPF to step up and take the lead at the police posts 
that have, for the past nearly eight years, been supported by RAMSI. As a 
result, over the next two years, we will be gradually withdrawing RAMSI 
personnel from each of these police posts.” 
(2011a, p.1) 
 
Reducing the PPF presence meant Solomon Islanders had to engage with the local 
rule of law apparatus through the RSIPF. Fox and Miller-Idriss’ (2008) 
discussion about the importance of everyday taken-for-granted interactions also 
applies to institutions. Regular, everyday interaction with the RSIPF is significant 
in developing legitimacy in it as an institution and in the rule of law, which it 
represents. It builds taken-for-grantedness, weaving the rule of law into the fabric 
of everyday life in the minds of the public.  
 
The shift to capacity building of the RSIPF was in line with the general capacity 
building focus of RAMSI. Taking the argument of Tyler (2003) that perceptions of 
fairness in the law and order system are paramount in building legitimacy, the 
shift to capacity building and mentoring is about developing the RSIPF into an 
institution which is perceived as fair, and hence increasing process legitimacy. 
With this capacity building, an important focus was on using PPF advisors: 
 
“to improve the RSIPF’s performance in the areas of professional 
standards, human resources, learning and development, strategy and 
policy, public relations, finance, and logistics” 
(Coppel, 2011b, p.4) 
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This is the same argument discussed in Chapter Six where the establishment of 
the rule of law within the civil service, primarily through third dimensional 
means, is vital for wider legitimisation of the rule of law. In light of the discussion 
above regarding depoliticisation/technocratisation, the move to capacity building 
in the PPF is also another step in this direction: it increases the distance between 
RAMSI and the public, further reducing public presence.  
 
Realigning 
While the reduction in public relations reduced the more visible aspects of 
RAMSI’s parallel nature, the procedural and strategic situation changed with the 
creation of the Partnership Framework. The formation of this document 
concluded in April 2009, Cabinet endorsed it on 14 May and the Forum 
Ministerial Standing Committee did so on 15 May 2009 (SIG, 2009b). Former 
Special Coordinator, Graeme Wilson, described the Partnership Framework as: 
 
“a living document [that] provides a strategic work plan to guide RAMSI’s 
assistance to the Solomon Islands within the Mission’s mandate and in 
accordance with Solomon Islands Government priorities.” 
(Wilson in SIG, 2009b, p. 95) 
 
One of the core principles of the document exemplifies this: the alignment of 
RAMSI activities with SIG priorities and objectives within RAMSI’s mandate 
(SIG, 2009c). The principles of capacity building, a topic that was described as 
cutting across all pillars, is also relevant. It stated RAMSI would: 
 
“ensure that its capacity development processes are increasingly aligned 
with Solomon Islands needs and expectations. RAMSI will directly 
support SIG agencies to:  
- jointly plan for, monitor and report on progress towards agency self-
reliance” 
(p.15) 
 
The clearest implication for legitimacy in the rule of law is that it helped undo 
some of the damage done when RAMSI was making a show of its work and not 
aligned with SIG priorities. Aligning with SIG priorities is a meaningful imparting 
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of international legitimacy onto the state, which was necessary when the lack of 
ties between RAMSI and SIG became apparent.  
 
The realignment of capacity building to the needs of Solomon Islands on the 
surface gave more room for individuals to colonise institutions and to bring local 
elements into the state apparatus. However, the capacity of the trainer to 
undertake work outside their background becomes the limiting factor. The 
majority of RAMSI staff were Australian, their background is in the Australian 
system and their ability to respond to certain local desires therefore limited. The 
realignment of RAMSI priorities did not change the trainer-trainee relationship 
and authority in this relationship still rested with RAMSI. Nonetheless, the 
appearance of increasing this reverse flow from trainee to trainer is important in 
combating the scenario described by Talentino (2007) and improves buy-in to the 
whole enterprise. It protects gains made in building legitimacy in the rule of law. 
However, this does not address the underlying issue of the individual-
institutional equilibrium. This raises the question of if gains can continue to be 
protected. 
 
The Striving Forward Discourse 
In conjunction with downplaying RAMSI activities, there was an increased focus 
on the role of Solomon Islanders in rebuilding the country in RAMSI discourse. 
Graeme Wilson, for the sixth anniversary of RAMSI, gave a particularly stirring 
example of this discourse in a speech. With allusion to creating a well-governed, 
prosperous and peaceful Solomon Islands, he stated: 
 
“I think this can be best seen in the renewed vigour that we see all around 
us in the day-to-day workings of this nation. It shines through in the 
enthusiasm of politicians, supported by hard-working public servants, to 
consider and debate new legislation. It shines through in the commitment 
of the Government to continue the difficult process of economic and 
political reform, to pursue much needed work on anti-corruption 
measures and to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. And it 
shines through in the enthusiasm of ordinary Solomon Islanders in all 
walks of life for moving forward, for putting the past behind them and 
building a better future for their children and their children’s children.” 
(Wilson, 2009, p. 2) 
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This approach focuses on developing legitimacy through fostering a shared belief 
in what the country is moving towards, i.e. a functioning modern state in the 
Western model, built upon the rule of law. The development of this shared belief 
therefore requires a mobilisation of the third dimension of domination to 
establish that truth. As explained in the literature review a discourse becomes 
truth when it establishes a hegemony over other competing discourses.  
 
RAMSI’s extensive use of statements where Solomon Islanders are portrayed as 
the ones moving the Solomon Islands’ state towards an end already established by 
RAMSI and the wider international community, therefore, attempted to build 
hegemony about the truth, or rightness of the said endpoint. For if Solomon 
Islanders are doing these things with such vigour, they must believe in the goal, 
or at least that is the intended message to the recipients of this discourse. This is 
done by what is described in the literature review and termed the deferral of 
reference by Cooper (1993). The situation described in the above quote, and in 
many other RAMSI speeches, refers to an idealistic world where all Solomon 
Islanders are cohesively (a term that must always be treated as suspect according 
to Sutherland (2005)) striving towards a common goal, both from the top-down 
and the bottom-up. It is from this imaginary world that these statements draw 
their ability to hegemonise new truths and build shared belief legitimacy in the 
rule of law.  
 
The Step-up Discourse 
On the other side of the discourse described above highlighting the good that 
Solomon Islanders are doing, this period saw an increase in calls that Solomon 
Islanders need to step up into the space created by RAMSI, and undertake both 
bottom-up and top-down action to ensure progress. These calls increased as 
RAMSI approached its transition in 2013, with corruption targeted as a particular 
issue of importance. Tim George discusses the evils of corruption in his address to 
the Transparency International Pacific Regional Conference (2007): 
 
“It is that hidden ability of corruption to corrode the values of good 
people, to undermine the best intentions of a social group or indeed a 
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nation that has really struck me since I came to live in Solomon Islands. 
The corrosive impact of corruption in undermining institutions and 
people’s confidences in them has more far reaching consequences in a 
relatively small and developing nation.” 
(p.5) 
 
In his address for the 2010 International Anti-corruption Day, the then RAMSI 
Special Co-ordinator said the following: 
 
“You, the people of this nation, through your churches, through your 
community leaders and your members of Parliament must demand better 
from your public service, your government, your leaders and yourselves. 
The Solomon Islands public service is accountable to your leaders who are 
in turn accountable to the voters – that is you. This is what good 
governance is all about. Both corruption and anti-corruption stops and 
starts with you the people of Solomon Islands.” 
(Wilson, 2010, p.3) 
 
These, and a plethora of other statements and advertisements, reiterate the fact 
that for anti-corruption initiatives to be successful everyone must take 
responsibility and make a stand against corruption. This discourse portrays 
corruption, and the damage it does to the state and communities, as a threat that 
Solomon Islanders must stand up to in opposition.  
 
Chapter Four shows the importance of threats in developing shared-beliefs 
(Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010). Corruption is such a threat and a suitably internal 
one to reflect the shift to an individual, internal conception of security described 
by Longo (2013). Solomon Islanders must pull together to fight corruption, which 
threatens to undermine their country. Additionally, in Western discourse 
strengthening and adherence to the rule of law is a fundamental element in 
combating corruption (Mendonça and Fonseca, 2012). This shows a third 
dimensional strategy of domination that aims to define corruption’s place in the 
world and the peoples’ place in relation to it. It expresses a situation of opposition 
and tension, where corruption is eating away at the state and depriving Solomon 
Islanders of state services. As the rule of law is fundamental to addressing 
corruption, if people are to confront corruption in their everyday lives and hold 
politicians to account, they must apply the rule of law. Such an application, 
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especially every day, is essential to the internalisation of the rule of law and the 
development of a shared belief in it.  
 
The effects of this anti-corruption rhetoric also applies to wider RAMSI discourse 
regarding the need for all Solomon Islanders to address law and order issues as it 
is ‘everyone’s responsibility’. At the opening of the Lata Police Housing Nicholas 
Coppel, said, “I urge the community here in Temotu to provide strong support to 
their police force in the coming months… Law and order is everyone’s 
responsibility” (Coppel, 2011). In a related statement, a RAMSI PPF officer said: 
 
“Law and order is everyone’s responsibility… neither the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force, nor RAMSI will be able to cover the entire country, 
all of the time. Community elders must show leadership and guidance for 
their community in helping to stamp out criminal behaviour.” 
(Tsimes in RAMSI, 2011c, p.1) 
 
Essentially, to address these problems people need to apply the rule of law in 
their everyday lives. In the language of Fairclough (2001), these texts imply a 
members’ resource that can be drawn upon that sees rule of law-based 
approaches as the appropriate means to address corruption and other law and 
order issues. Yet, as has been discussed in previous chapters, there are other 
systems of conflict resolution in Solomon Islands, other members’ resources to 
draw on when interpreting information. The conflict between these different 
members’ resources causes problems. 
 
Conclusion 
Many interesting things occurred in Stage Three and it is where the utilisation of 
the third dimension of domination was most prominent.  Due to the criticism that 
RAMSI and SIG did not align, an overall shift towards the constitutional peace 
occurred. An important part of this was RAMSI realigning with SIG and stepping 
back from the spotlight. Part of this step back was a downplaying of RAMSI’s 
public relations and a reduction in its general frontline presence. Stepping back 
resulted in more engagement between Solomon Islanders and state institutions. 
This is important in building ‘taken-for-grantedness’. It also helped remove 
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RAMSI from the public spotlight and make it disappear into the normal everyday 
operations of the state. RAMSI depoliticised and technocratisised itself, 
developing its own taken-for-grantedness. Along with protecting RAMSI’s own 
legitimacy, it further hid the political nature of the rule of law and portrayed the 
work done to strengthen it as a value neutral, rationalistic endeavour.  
 
In addition to this reorientation, two important discourses saw their strongest 
application in this period, both relating to the importance the constitutional 
peace places on mixing top-down with bottom-up approaches. The first is that 
Solomon Islanders are striving onwards in making the country a better place. The 
second is that they need to step up into the space RAMSI has created. The first of 
these developed shared belief legitimacy by referencing an imagined world where 
all Solomon Islanders are developing the rule of law. Where this imagined world 
intersects the real one is the site where truth is attempting to establish itself. The 
establishment of this truth is a process of developing shared belief legitimacy. The 
other, somewhat contradictory, discourse pays particular attention to corruption. 
It portrays corruption as a threat that Solomon Islanders must rally together to 
overcome through utilising the rule of law and its associated apparatuses. This 
works to develop shared-belief legitimacy in the rule of law and establish it as the 
members’ resource to draw upon when confronted by the issue of corruption. 
  
Making a concept, like the rule of law, legitimate is about making it into the 
primary members’ resource that people draw upon to interpret a given situation. 
RAMSI has worked throughout the three periods discussed to establish the rule of 
law as the dominant members’ resource. However, if this research itself is to 
influence the development of the members’ resources of the reader, the 
information contained above needs to be related back to the research questions 
and the wider field of development. 
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Chapter Nine: Drawing Together 
This thesis has sought to understand how the liberal peace agenda develops 
legitimacy in the rule of law in post-conflict states, investigated through a case 
study investigation of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI). It has attempted to make visible the different strategies of domination 
used, understand the impact of the intervention’s legitimacy on the work, and 
draw conclusions about the long-term implications of how the liberal peace 
agenda operates on sustainability and development. Chapter One began with 
establishing the research and situating it within the wider topic of international 
development. Important contextual information about the case study was then set 
out in Chapters Two and Three, containing information on the history of Solomon 
Islands and RAMSI. Following this, a literature review set out the wider academic 
debate around peacebuilding, the rule of law, and legitimacy.  The last chapter 
before the discussion of the three stages of RAMSI developed the research 
methodology. The key discussion of the thesis was broken into three chapters, 
each addressing a different chronological period of RAMSI: initial intervention, 
the shift to statebuilding, and the retreat from view. Finally, this concluding 
chapter draws on the findings contained in the discussion to answer the research 
questions established at the beginning of this thesis. 
 
The Effectiveness of First Action 
The process for creating the preconditions for wider development work is the 
most successful when it is the most distant from the mainstream development 
agenda,  as embodied in documents such as the Paris Declaration. Of course, 
these initial gains occur in a completely different environment than those 
attempted when the security aspects of the rule of law are established. Through 
entering the country at the right time, utilising overwhelming force, and 
structuring the intervention in a way mindful of its own legitimacy, the liberal 
peace agenda has been shown to be able to effectively re-establish the monopoly 
on violence to a legitimate institution and achieve broad-based local support. 
After this initial action, the utilisation of in-line staff is important in restoring 
basic functionality to the state, especially amongst institutions that interact 
frequently with the public, like the judiciary. It is through these actions that a 
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semblance of legitimacy in the rule of law is established, which at least allows the 
exertion of coercive force to ensure a degree of compliance with the tenets the 
rule of law depends on.   
 
The first actions of RAMSI described in this thesis highlight a key goal of the 
contemporary liberal agenda and one it is well suited for: rapidly addressing a 
crisis through the achievement of clearly defined targets relating to symptomatic 
issues. The word ‘symptomatic’ is not used to belittle the work done: it was very 
important and saved many lives. It merely highlights that stopping violence, 
extortion, and intimidation (by restoring a basic form of the rule of law) is not 
enough to achieve lasting peace. Peacebuilding, and aid more generally, has 
shown it is able to deal with clearly defined issues, things like removing guns from 
communities, or getting ‘X’ item to ‘Y’ people. These tasks are no small feats and 
require the mobilisation of considerable resources. They are successful because 
they are more readily broken down rationally and prescriptively planned. These 
tasks are closest to the types of issues that rationalistic investigation is best at 
addressing. Undertaking this kind of work is a strength of the liberal peace 
agenda and an important focus. However, it is with the fuzzy problems where 
more diverse and complex strategies are required. Fuzzy problems lack clearly 
defined parameters and have no simple solution. These are issues such as 
corruption, climate change, or achieving the internalisation of the rule of law. 
Regarding this last issue, liberal peacebuilders have shown they can mobilise a 
comprehensive and diverse range of tools for its achievement, in addition to those 
used initially. 
 
Capacity Building and then Some 
Developing legitimacy in the rule of law requires addressing the four elements of 
legitimacy identified by the OECD (2010) and achieving this requires a diverse 
range of strategies. RAMSI has shown how an intervention based solidly on the 
liberal peace consensus can mobilise such a range of strategies, both intentionally 
and unintentionally (unintentionally due to emergent properties from RAMSI as 
an organisational system). Of course, the dominant approach of contemporary 
peacebuilding, one that is present right across development, and one that was at 
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the core of RAMSI, was capacity building. This approach assumes that the 
development of state capacity leads to improved delivery of state services and 
empowers the state to address the root causes of conflict, inequality, and poverty. 
 
Capacity building is not that simple however, and necessitates an integrated 
approach addressing three different levels of the state: the individual, as 
characterised by the trainer-trainee relationship; the organisation, characterised 
by developing an organisational culture that internalises the rule of law; and the 
government, characterised by developing a self-perpetuating state based on the 
rule of law. The trainer-trainee system, even with trainee led reviews and trainer 
selection, is a hierarchical relationship of imbalanced power and skill transfer: I 
have the knowledge to get this country working and I am going to teach it to you. 
The ‘proper’ knowledge, skills, and beliefs (as defined by what is needed to 
operate within a given institution) are the things being added to the individual to 
build their capacity. Organisational capacity building creates a civil service that 
interacts with and within the organisation in the ‘proper’ (as defined by the 
proper structure needed to form the modern state) way. Constraining and 
shaping behaviour through things like codes of conduct, legislation, 
accountability mechanisms, and the individual capacity building achieves this. 
Finally, at the wider governmental level, capacity building focuses on building the 
right institutions so that they form a cohesive unit that perpetuate the form of the 
state and allow it to slot into the international system.  
 
For the Western state model and the rule of law, it is the rule of law all the way 
down. The government is made of institutions that utilise the rule of law to 
function; they are comprised of individuals who interact with the 
institution/organisation in a tightly rules-based structure; and the skills and 
knowledge these individuals draw upon is premised on the idea that society 
should be organised via the rule of law. It is this conception of the state that the 
liberal peace consensus and wider development practices develops, as this is the 
kind of state that is assumed as intrinsically legitimate. As long as the ultimate 
goal of capacity building is to develop institutions as they are externally defined, 
the capacity building relationship will be on of hierarchical, one-way, skill 
transfer. It is hard to deny the neo-colonial overtones of this relationship. 
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It is from the assumptions about what a proper state looks like, and what aspects 
are intrinsically ‘true’, that the contemporary consensus is able to set the agenda 
of the primary actions needed to restore process and output legitimacy in the 
state. For RAMSI this was epitomised by the mandate. The liberal peace agenda 
includes tasks like establishing a market-orientated economy, adhering to human 
rights, and shaping behaviour according to the rule of law, all prominent themes 
in development work. The belief that these aspects, and others, form a true 
definition of the state and are hence legitimate due to this claimed ‘truth’ is 
misplaced: all of the aspects are culturally constructed. Primarily the agenda 
establishes a hierarchy of tasks that lead to peace and development. Unavoidably, 
placing these goals at the top of the agenda displaces other goals that may be 
more contextually relevant. Certain key issues are not then identified or 
addressed, the dangers of which have been shown regarding Timor-Leste. This 
shows a second dimensional strategy of domination. What is more, the portrayal 
that the contents of the mandate, or the liberal peace consensus, are true is in 
turn a mobilisation of a particular discourse aimed to make people believe that 
the associated concepts and institutions are intrinsically legitimate.   
 
The liberal peace consensus, with its focus on the intervention being dependant 
on permission from the host country government and the utilisation of a non-
absolutist conception of sovereignty, which allows the host country to remain 
sovereign, gives international legitimacy to the state. It acts as an endorsement of 
the capacity of the state, and the rule of law by association, offering a form of 
legitimacy. RAMSI showed how this could be reinforced for the rule of law by 
establishing a system where staff are at least partially accountable to the local rule 
of law apparatus through shared jurisdiction. This is important because donor 
institutions are not just accountable to the citizens in donor countries but to the 
recipients as well. 
 
The liberal peace agenda, as embodied by RAMSI, has also shown a capacity for 
acknowledging the importance of developing shared-belief legitimacy. Due to the 
relationship between belief and truth, it is the third dimension of domination that 
is the most powerful in developing this kind of legitimacy. Discourse, as a key 
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factor shaping how we see the world, is central to shared-belief legitimacy. For 
RAMSI there were two main discourses of importance. The first revolved around 
the idea that Solomon Islanders were collectively striving towards making 
Solomon Islands a better country, based on the rule of law. The second focused on 
the need for Solomon Islanders to step up into the gap created by RAMSI to 
address corruption by utilising the rule of law apparatus. These discourses are an 
attempt to transplant externally-derived concepts into the local environment and 
develop shared-beliefs around them. 
 
Promoting engagement between locals and local institutions is also important. 
Local ownership is central to these interactions, as is ensuring the institutions 
serve the people. These interactions, especially the everyday taken-for-granted 
ones, build legitimacy in the institution and a belief in its place in society; if the 
institution works properly that is. The utilisation of discourse and other strategies 
that build taken-for-grandness are powerful because they are the least visible. 
There use in conjunction with more visible work, like capacity building, is 
necessary to form a comprehensive strategy for developing legitimacy that 
addresses all four of its dimensions: process, output, international, and shared-
belief. An intervention or organisation is in a strong position if it is able to 
mobilise a diverse range of strategies addressing the four types of legitimacy. 
However, if the institution is not mindful of its own legitimacy this can be 
undermined.  
 
The Importance of Legitimacy in Developing 
Legitimacy 
To undertake any development/peacebuilding work a concern for the legitimacy 
of the organisation carrying out the work is paramount. If locals perceive an 
institution, be it an intervention, foreign state department, or NGO, as 
illegitimate and in opposition to legitimate local institutions, so too will they 
perceive its work. It is more likely that the work is seen as some sort of neo-
colonial exercise and that locals are being pushed to conform to outside norms. 
An ugly institution makes for ugly work. RAMSI has shown the importance of 
avoiding this. Firstly, a regional approach, as opposed to an international or 
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country-based one, is important. It allows the institution to draw upon shared 
histories and institutional commonalities, such as a shared tradition of common 
law. This produces a type of surrogate legitimacy allowing the institution to 
perform its initial work without excessive coercion. A regional approach also 
brings a plurality of views into the institution and reduces perceptions of 
domination by a particular country. The situation where interventions are 
dependent on the host country and designed to operate within and below the host 
government also protects legitimacy. It further limits any claims that the 
institution is acting in a neo-colonial or dictatorial manner, depending on the 
legitimacy of the recipient country’s government of course. Finally, the 
development of a system where development/peacebuilding staff are accountable 
for their actions under local jurisdictions lessens any ‘us and them’ rhetorics that 
may be present.   
 
Along with getting the initial form of the intervention/institution correct, the 
organisation needs to respond to the changing environment to protect its 
legitimacy. For RAMSI the main moment where this was crucial was with the 
tensions that emerged in 2006 (described in Chapter Three). RAMSI responded 
by realigning to be more in step with SIG and developing its community outreach 
programme. Such relatively straightforward actions are important in maintaining 
legitimacy as they give, or at least seem to give, local people more agency in the 
process. They build ownership of the work done amongst the local people. It is 
ownership, the feeling that your beliefs are colonising the work, which is crucial 
in developing shared-belief legitimacy.  
 
However, counter to the promotion of this increased ownership is the process of 
depoliticisation/technocratisation that directly reduces it. This process, that 
causes an institution to become another cog in the machinery of government, is a 
powerful tool to hide the unappealing political and cultural aspects of an 
institution/concept, and to develop shared belief-legitimacy.  Developing taken-
for-grantedness achieves the first aspect. By simply not being seen as much, or 
seen in ways that slot into everyday life, the institution becomes naturalised into 
the local state ecosystem that is meant to work for the benefit of all.  Additionally, 
portraying the work as a technocratic/scientific process develops shared-belief 
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legitimacy by drawing on the idea that such a process is value neutral. All the 
intervention is doing is applying rational tools to unpick a mechanistic world then 
stitch it back up in a way best for everyone. It is the portrayal of the process as a 
technocratic exercise that reduces local ownership. It makes ‘development 
experts’ into the only ones able to properly understand the process and do the 
work, and as discussed regarding Bosnia such exclusion of the public can have 
destabilising effects. This exclusion reflects a fundamental flaw in the 
contemporary agenda that exposes the value-laden nature of peacebuilding and 
development; a flaw that necessitates further explanation. 
 
A Disturbed Equilibrium  
The central weakness of development, peacebuilding, and RAMSI are their 
reliance on externally-derived definitions of concepts such as the rule of law, the 
form of the state, or development itself. It is from these definitions that the 
direction of all subsequent work is set. They are the foundations of institutional 
path-dependence. All too often, it is assumed that the concepts are intrinsically 
legitimate and that transplanting them into another country is a simple matter of 
creating the right environment for them to take root. This ignores the culturally 
constructed nature of these concepts. The formation of the Western idea of the 
state and concepts such as the rule of law emerged through a long history of 
interaction between the state and individuals, where state institutions shaped the 
individual, but individuals were able to feedback and change institutions as well. 
Together this formed an equilibrium between the colonisation of the state and the 
colonisation of the individual. This process of give and take was central to 
developing legitimacy in different concepts and institutions. People had true 
ownership over them because they shaped their development. Taking Western 
concepts and applying them without change in a new locality ignores this crucial 
(but time consuming) method of developing legitimacy. What is worse, it sets 
these transplanted concepts up in direct opposition to local ones that have 
developed over time in such a way. For the rule of law, such local concepts include 
customary law and restorative justice practices. In a situation of opposition, 
shared belief legitimacy is very difficult to establish and hamstrings any 
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establishment of ‘truth’. Without truth and belief, internalisation is not possible 
and without internalisation, the rule of law can only ever be coercive. 
 
While in opposition both cannot be legitimate, they are two separate members’ 
resources. However, it is not possible, for the rule of law anyway, to just do away 
with the introduced conception and pursue the local. If a country wants to engage 
internationally, a certain adherence to the rule of law is necessary, as the rule of 
law has been internalised by international institutions. Over time, it has been 
integrated across organisations and the rule of law now forms a foundational 
element of the international system. For example, dominant aid modalities such 
as general budget support and sector wide approaches necessitate functional, 
rules-based public financial management in the recipient country to ensure 
accountability.  Therefore, the way forward is to develop new, locally specific, 
members’ resources;  ones that combine aspects of introduced conceptions with 
local views to create something that while unique, is recognisable to all parties. It 
is about developing not just hybrid institutions, but hybrid definitions, because it 
is from these definitions that we organise our society. How this is to occur is 
obviously a huge question, and a major area for further research, but some work 
has been done, like that by Clements et al. (2007). It is also something that 
becomes more difficult over time. As more structures are built, and more self-
reinforcing path-dependence loops set up, it becomes harder and harder to 
change these foundational concepts.  
 
Conclusion 
It is undeniable that RAMSI and the contemporary agenda have been extremely 
successful in many aspects. This is especially true with the initial restoration of 
the security and output aspects of the rule of law. The previous three chapters 
have also revealed an ability to mobilise different strategies (both intentionally 
and unintentionally) that target the four different dimensions of legitimacy. 
Taken with the ability to respond to changes in the host country environment and 
protect the legitimacy of the intervention, the contemporary agenda has shown 
considerable awareness of what is required to develop legitimacy in the rule of 
law. However, for all the strengths of development, peacebuilding, and RAMSI 
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and the robustness of their strategies, a reliance on externally-derived definitions 
undermines it all. To achieve lasting peace (without the application of a lot of 
force over a long time to remove oppositional beliefs of what is true) new, hybrid, 
and contextual concepts need to be established. Hybridity is not about throwing 
the liberal agenda away. The processes used are not broken. Instead, they are 
diverse, complex, comprehensive, and designed and implemented by smart, 
passionate people. The problem is not that the concepts assumed as true are false; 
they are no more true or false than any other belief. What matters is that a stable 
state needs to reflect the beliefs of its people but also reflect internationally held 
beliefs if it wants to engage in the international system. It is the conflict that 
arises when these differ that undermines everything. The way around this issue is 
having the conflicting ideas meet and co-colonise each other, taking strengths 
from both sides to create something new, but also familiar. This creates a new 
foundation for development and sets it along a different path: one that is 
sustainable, unique to the locality, and just.  
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